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Abstract
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tions among a group of people. Our model incorporates two key aspects of the
cooperative process of knowledge creation: (i) heterogeneity of people in their state
of knowledge is essential for successful cooperation in the joint creation of new ideas,
while (ii) the very process of cooperative knowledge creation a¤ects the heterogeneity
of people through the accumulation of knowledge in common. The model features
myopic agents in a pure externality model of interaction. Surprisingly, in the gen-
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nd that the equilibrium process
of knowledge creation converges to the most productive state, where the popula-
tion splits into smaller groups of optimal size; close interaction takes place within
each group only. This optimal size is larger as the heterogeneity of knowledge is
more important in the knowledge production process. Equilibrium paths are found
analytically, and they are a discontinuous function of initial heterogeneity. JEL
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1 Introduction
How do knowledge creation and transfer perpetuate themselves? How do
agents change during this process? What are the implications of the knowledge
production process for R & D team size and characteristics?
There are a number of empirical regularities that we seek to address.
Kaplinsky (1983) nds that in industries with rapid technical change, such
as the computer software industry, rms start large but then generate spin-
o¤s, so the average rm size decreases dramatically at a certain point in time.
Why and when does this occur? Can we explain why the mean number of
team members in the Broadway musical industry increased from 2 to 7 be-
tween 1880 and 1930, and has remained constant since then?1 Why are there
a large number of small rms in Higashi Osaka or in Ota ward in Tokyo, each
specializing in di¤erent but related manufacturing services? Another example
is the third Italy, where a large number of small rms produce a great variety
of di¤erentiated products. Yet another example is the restaurant industry
in Berkeley, California.2 In each case, the heterogeneity of workers and tacit
knowledge accumulated within rms play a central role in the operation of the
rms.
To address these empirical questions, we construct a dynamic model of
group knowledge creation. As people create and transfer knowledge, they
change. Thus, the history of meetings and their content is important. If
people meet for a long time, then their base of knowledge in common increases,
and their partnership eventually becomes less productive. Similarly, if two
persons have very di¤erent knowledge bases, they have little common ground
for communication, so their partnership will not be very productive.
For these reasons, we attempt to model endogenous agent heterogeneity, or
horizontal agent di¤erentiation, to look at the permanent e¤ects of knowledge
creation and growth.3 In describing our model, the analogy between partner
dancing and working jointly to create and exchange knowledge is useful, so we
will use terms from these activities interchangeably. We assume that it is not
possible for more than two persons to meet or dance at one time, though more
than one couple can dance simultaneously. When agents meet, they create
1See Guimerà et al (2005) and Barabási (2005) for data and comment.
2In Berkeley, the parent restaurant is Chez Panisse.
3For simplicity, we employ a deterministic framework. It seems possible to add stochastic
elements to the model, but at the cost of complexity. It should also be possible to apply the
law of large numbers to a more basic stochastic framework to obtain equivalent results.
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new, shared knowledge, thus building up knowledge in common. When agents
are not meeting with each other, their knowledge bases grow more di¤erent.
The fastest rate of knowledge creation occurs when common and di¤erential
knowledge are in balance. Knowledge creation and individual production all
occur simultaneously at each point in time. The income of an agent at any
given time is generated at a rate proportional to the agents current stock of
knowledge, as is new knowledge when an agent dances alone. Agents seek to
maximize the current ow of income (the same as production) under certainty
about everyones state of knowledge, so a myopic core concept is used. The
dancers can work alone or with a partner. The suitability of dance partners
depends on the stock of knowledge they have in common and their respective
stocks of exclusive knowledge.
For simplicity, we deal primarily with the case when the agents are sym-
metric. Our model is analytically tractable, so we do not have to resort to
simulations; we nd each equilibrium path explicitly. In this paper we con-
sider only knowledge creation, not transfer. In Berliant and Fujita (2006), we
work out the two person case with both knowledge creation and transfer, while
allowing asymmetries. The results are similar, but the calculations are more
complicated.
Our results are summarized as follows. There is a unique sink point that
depends discontinuously on initial conditions. Only one of four specied
sequences of dance patterns can occur along the equilibrium path. When the
initial state features relative homogeneity of knowledge between agents, the
sink will be the most productive state, where the population splits into smaller
groups of optimal size; close interaction takes place within each group only.
This optimal size is larger as the heterogeneity of knowledge is more important
in the knowledge production process. The result demonstrating that the sink
point is the most productive state is most surprising to us, as we posit a
model with myopic agents and no markets, but rather with only externalities
in interactions between agents, so one would not expect e¢ cient outcomes. It
is also surprising to note that from an initially symmetric situation, the model
generates asymmetries in the following sense. Both the size and characteristics
of research teams are endogenous; workers in the same group continue to work
together, but their knowledge prole drifts away from the prole of workers
who are not part of the same group. This creates the boundaries of research
teams endogenously.
The model is also at an intermediate level of aggregation. That is, al-
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though it is at a more micro level than large aggregate models, we do not work
out completely its microfoundations. That is left to future research.
Future applications and extensions of the model are numerous.4 For in-
stance, to address questions related to how knowledge diversity or patent policy
a¤ects long run economic growth, it would be possible to employ our model as
the R & D sector of a growth model. To address questions related to R & D
rm agglomeration, a spatial dimension could be introduced explicitly, where
agents can interact only with others in their region, but migration can lead to
recombinations of agents from di¤erent regions.
We believe that our model can be tested further by examining the dynamic
pattern of teams. Do R & D teams experience employment turnover early
in an industry and then settle down? Does rm size in an industry begin
large and then suddenly become small? Is team size related to the mutual
knowledge required for an industrys R & D process? Do coauthorships in
economics or other elds follow the interaction paths predicted by our model?
Di¤erentiation of agents in terms of quality (or vertical characteristics) of
knowledge is studied in Jovanovic and Rob (1989) in the context of a search
model. In contrast, our model examines (endogenous) horizontal heterogeneity
of agents and its e¤ect on knowledge creation and consumption.
Our work is related to the literature on teams; see for example Holmstrom
(1982) or Aoki (1994). In general, this literature explores how the moral
hazard or free rider problem is solved in group production. Smaller or more
homogeneous groups will reduce this problem. Our framework abstracts from
information asymmetry, instead focusing on the dynamics of the endogenous
composition and size of teams due to knowledge heterogeneity. Empirical
work must account for both aspects.
Section 2 gives the model and notation, Section 3 analyzes equilibrium in
the case of two participants or dancers for expositional purposes, Section 4
extends the model to N persons and analyzes equilibrium, whereas Section 5
explores the e¢ ciency properties of equilibrium. In order to investigate the
nature of optimal group size, Section 6 extends the basic model to allow the im-
portance of heterogeneity in knowledge creation to vary exogenously. Section
7 gives our conclusions and suggestions for future dancing. Two appendices
provide the proofs of key results.
4An important question for future research is whether the surprising result that the sink
point is the most productive state is robust in a more general context, for example with
knowledge transfer. We conjecture that it is, because when agents determine their group
size, they account for knowledge transfer from other groups.
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2 The Model - Ideas and Knowledge
In this section, we introduce the basic concepts of our model of ideas and
knowledge.
An idea is represented by a box. It has a label on it that everyone can
read (the label is common knowledge in the game we shall describe). This
label describes the contents. Each box contains an idea that is described by
its label. Learning the actual contents of the box, as opposed to its label,
takes time, so although anyone can read the label on the box, they cannot
understand its contents without investing time. This time is used to open the
box and to understand fully its contents. An example is a recipe for making
udon noodles as in Takamatsu. It is labelled as such, but would take time
to learn. Another example is reading a paper in a journal. Its label or title
can be understood quickly, but learning the contents of the paper requires an
investment of time. Production of a new paper, which is like opening a new
box, either jointly or individually, also takes time.
Suppose we have an innite number of boxes, each containing a di¤erent
piece of knowledge, which is what we call an idea. We put them in a row in
an arbitrary order.
There are N persons in the economy, where N is a nite integer. People
are indexed by i and j. At this point, we assume that there are only two
people; general indexing is used so that we can add more people to the model
later. We assume that each person has a replica of the innite row of boxes
introduced above, and that each copy of the row has the same order. Our
model features continuous time. Fix time t 2 R+ and consider any person
i. A box is indexed by k = 1; 2; ::: Take any box k. If person i knows the
idea inside that box, we put a sticker on it that says 1; otherwise, we put a
sticker on it that says 0. That is, let xki (t) 2 f0; 1g be the sticker on box k
for person i at time t. The state of knowledge, or just knowledge, of person i
at time t is thus dened to be Ki(t) = (x1i (t); x
2
i (t); :::) 2 f0; 1g1. The reason
we use an innite vector of possible ideas is that we are using an innite time
horizon, and there are always new ideas that might be discovered, even in
the preparation of udon noodles. More formally, let H be the Hilbert cube; it
consists of all real sequences with values in [0; 1]. That is, if N is the set of
natural numbers, then H = [0; 1]N. So the knowledge of person i at time t,
Ki(t), is a vertex of the Hilbert cube H. Notice that given any vertex of H,
there exists an innite number of adjacent vertices. That is, given Ki(t) with
only nitely many non-zero components, there is an innite number of ideas
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that could be created in the next step.
In this paper, we will treat ideas symmetrically. Extensions to idea hier-
archies and knowledge structures will be discussed in the conclusions.
Given Ki(t) = (x1i (t); x
2
i (t); :::),
ni(t) =
1X
k=1
xki (t) (1)
represents the number of ideas known by person i at time t. Next, we will
dene the number of ideas that two persons, i and j, both know. Assume that
j 6= i. Dene Kj(t) = (x1j(t); x2j(t); :::) and
ncij(t) =
1X
k=1
xki (t)  xkj (t) (2)
So ncij(t) represents the number of ideas known by both persons i and j at
time t. Notice that i and j are symmetric in this denition, so ncij(t) = n
c
ji(t).
Dene
ndij(t) = ni(t)  ncij(t) (3)
to be the number of ideas known by person i but not known by person j at
time t. Then, it holds by denition that
ni(t) = n
c
ij(t) + n
d
ij(t) (4)
Dene nij(t) be the total number of ideas possessed by persons i and j together
at time t. Then, tautologically
nij(t) = ncij(t) + n
d
ij(t) + n
d
ji(t) (5)
Knowledge is a set of ideas that are possessed by a person at a particular
time. However, knowledge is not a static concept. New knowledge can be
produced either individually or jointly, and ideas can be shared with others.
But all of this activity takes time.
Now we describe the components of the rest of the model. To keep the
description as simple as possible, we focus on just two agents, i and j. At each
time, each faces a decision about whether or not to meet with others. If two
agents want to meet at a particular time, a meeting will occur. If an agent
decides not to meet with anyone at a given time, then the agent produces
separately and also creates new knowledge separately, away from everyone
else. If two persons do decide to meet at a given time, then they collaborate
to create new knowledge together.
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So consider a given time t. In order to explain how knowledge creation
and commodity production work, it is useful for intuition (but not technically
necessary) to view this time period of xed length as consisting of subperi-
ods of xed length. Each individual is endowed with a xed amount of labor
that is supplied inelastically during the period. In the rst subperiod, in-
dividual production takes place. We shall assume constant returns to scale
in physical production, so it is not benecial for individuals to collaborate
in production. Each individual uses their labor during the rst subperiod to
produce consumption good on their own, whether or not they are meeting.
We shall assume below that although there are no increasing returns to scale
in production, the productivity of a persons labor depends on their stock of
knowledge. Activity in the second subperiod depends on whether or not there
is a meeting. If there is no meeting, then each person spends the second sub-
period creating new knowledge on their own. Evidently, the new knowledge
created during this subperiod di¤ers between the two persons, because they
are not communicating. They open di¤erent boxes. Since there is an innity
of di¤erent boxes, the probability that the two agents will open the same box
(even at di¤erent points in time), either working by themselves or in distinct
meetings, is assumed to be zero. If there is a meeting, then they create new
knowledge together, so they open boxes together.5 We wish to emphasize that
the division of a time period into subperiods is purely an expositional device.
Rigorously, whether or not a meeting occurs determines how much attention
is devoted to the various activities at a given time.
What do the agents know when they face the decision about whether or
not to meet a potential partner j at time t? Each person knows both Ki(t)
and Kj(t). In other words, each person is aware of their own knowledge and is
also aware of all othersknowledge. Thus, they also know ni(t), nj(t), ncij(t) =
ncji(t), n
d
ij(t), and n
d
ji(t) (for all j 6= i) when they decide whether or not to
meet at time t. The notation for whether or not a meeting of persons i and
j actually occurs at time t is: ij(t) = ji(t) = 1 if a meeting occurs and
ij(t) = ji(t) = 0 if no meeting occurs at time t. For convenience, we dene
ii(t) = 1 when person i works in isolation at time t, and ii(t) = 0 when
person i meets with another person at time t.
Next, we must specify the dynamics of the knowledge system and the ob-
jectives of the people in the model in order to determine whether or not two
persons decide to meet at a particular time. In order to accomplish this, it is
5Clearly, the creation of this paper is an example of the process described.
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easiest to abstract away from the notation for specic boxes, Ki(t), and to fo-
cus on the dynamics of the quantity statistics related to knowledge, ni(t), nj(t),
ncij(t) = n
c
ji(t), n
d
ij(t), and n
d
ji(t). Since we are treating ideas symmetrically, in
a sense these quantities are su¢ cient statistics for our analysis.6
The simplest piece of the model to specify is what happens if there is no
meeting between person i and anyone else, so i works in isolation. Let aii(t)
be the rate of creation of new ideas created by person i in isolation at time
t (this means that i meets with itself). Then we assume that the creation of
new knowledge during isolation is governed by the following equation:
aii(t) =   ni(t) when ii(t) = 1. (6)
So we assume that if there is no meeting at time t, individual knowledge grows
at a rate proportional to the knowledge already acquired by an individual.
If a meeting occurs between i and j at time t (ij(t) = 1), then joint
knowledge creation occurs, and it is governed by the following dynamics:7
aij(t) =   [ncij(t)  ndij(t)  ndji(t)]
1
3 when ij(t) = 1 for j 6= i (7)
So when two people meet, joint knowledge creation occurs at a rate propor-
tional to the normalized product of their knowledge in common, the di¤erential
knowledge of i from j, and the di¤erential knowledge of j from i. The rate
of creation of new knowledge is highest when the proportions of ideas in com-
mon, ideas exclusive to person i, and ideas exclusive to person j are split
evenly. Ideas in common are necessary for communication, whereas ideas ex-
clusive to one person or the other imply more heterogeneity or originality in
the collaboration. If one person in the collaboration does not have exclusive
ideas, there is no reason for the other person to meet and collaborate. The
multiplicative nature of the function in equation (7) drives the relationship
between knowledge creation and the relative proportions of ideas in common
6In principle, all of these time-dependent quantities are positive integers. However, for
simplicity we take them to be continuous (in R+) throughout the paper. One interpretation
is that the creation of an idea occurs at a stochastic time, and the real numbers are taken
to be the expected number of jumps (ideas learned) in a Poisson process. The use of an
integer instead of a real number seems to add little but complication to the analysis.
7We may generalize equation (7) as follows:
aij(t) = max
n
(  ")ni(t); (  ")nj(t); 

ncij(t)  ndij(t)  ndji(t)
 1
3
o
where " > 0 represents the costs from the lack of concentration. This generalization, however,
does not change the results presented in this paper in any essential way.
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and ideas exclusive to one or the other agent. Under these circumstances, no
knowledge creation in isolation occurs.
Whether a meeting occurs or not, there is production in each period for
both persons. Felicity (or instantaneous utility) in that time period is dened
to be the quantity of output.8 Dene yi(t) to be production output (or felicity)
for person i at time t, that is consumed by person i. The output is taken to
be numéraire. Normalizing the coe¢ cient of production to be 1, we take
yi(t) = ni(t) (8)
so output of private good for person i at time t is a function of person is
human capital; in turn, this is assumed to be person is stock of knowledge.
Person is lifetime utility is given by
Ui(0) =
Z 1
0
e t  yi(t)dt
where the constant  is the discount rate common to all agents. In the present
context, since yi(t) = ni(t) is the stock variable that is actually xed at time
t for each consumer i, what the consumer can choose at time t is the rate of
increase of income or knowledge, the ow variable:
_yi(t) = _ni(t) (9)
At this point, we introduce the assumption that the agents are myopic in choos-
ing their partners (or working in isolation). In particular, they do not foresee
the consequences of their choice of action on the future path of consumption,
but rather only see the immediate consequences, namely agent is objective at
time t is to maximize _yi(t).
By denition,
_yi(t)
yi(t)
=
_ni(t)
ni(t)
(10)
which represents the rate of growth of income. Since yi(t) is the stock vari-
able, choosing partners to maximize _yi(t) is the same as choosing partners to
maximize _yi(t)
yi(t)
.
We now describe the dynamics of the system, dropping the time argument.
8Given that the focus of this paper is on knowledge creation rather than production, we
use the simplest possible form for the production function.
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Let us focus on agent i, as the expressions for the other agents are analogous.
_yi = _ni =
NX
j=1
ij  aij (11)
_ncij = ij  aij for all j 6= i (12)
_ndij =
X
k 6=j
ik  aik for all j 6= i (13)
Equation (11) is based on the assumption that once learned, ideas are not
forgotten. Thus, the increase in the knowledge of person i is the sum of
the knowledge created in isolation and the knowledge created jointly with
someone else. Equation (12) means that the increase in the knowledge in
common for persons i and j equals the new knowledge created jointly by them.
Finally, equation (13) means that all the knowledge created by person i either
in isolation or joint with persons other than person j becomes a part of the
di¤erential knowledge of person i from person j.
By denition, it is also the case that
NX
j=1
ij = 1
Furthermore, on the equilibrium path it is necessary that
ij = ji for all i and j
Concerning the rule used by an agent to choose their best partner, to keep
the model tractable in this rst analysis, we assume a myopic rule. At each
moment of time t, person i would like a meeting with person j when the rate of
growth of income while meeting with j is highest among all potential partners,
including himself.9 As we are attempting to model close interactions within
groups, we assume that at each time, the myopic persons interacting choose a
core conguration. That is, we restrict attention to congurations such that at
any point in time, no coalition of persons can get together and make themselves
better o¤ in that time period. In essence, our solution concept at a point in
time is the myopic core.
In order to analyze our dynamic system, we rst divide all of our equations
by the total number of ideas possessed by i and j:
nij = ndij + n
d
ji + n
c
ij (14)
9We introduce later the rule used in the case of ties.
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and dene new variables
mcij  mcji =
ncij
nij
=
ncji
nij
mdij =
ndij
nij
, mdji =
ndji
nij
By denition, mdij represents the percentage of ideas exclusive to person i
among all the ideas known by person i or person j. Similarly, mcij represents
the ideas known in common by persons i and j among all the ideas known by
the pair. From (14), we obtain
1 = mdij +m
d
ji +m
c
ij (15)
Using these new variables, for each pair of dancers i and j (i 6= j), we obtain
(see Theorem A1 in Technical Appendix a):
aij
ni
= G(mdij;m
d
ji) for i 6= j (16)
where
G(mdij;m
d
ji) 

 
1 mdij  mdji
 mdij mdji 13
1 mdji
(17)
which represents the growth rate of their knowledge when two persons i and
j meet. Then, using (6) and (11), we can rewrite the income growth rate,
equation (10), as follows:
_yi
yi
=
_ni
ni
= ii  +
X
j 6=i
ij G(mdij;mdji) (18)
Furthermore, using (6), (7) and (16), we have (see Theorem A2 in Technical
Appendix a):
_mdij =  
 
1 mdij
  ii   1 mdji  jj mdij  ij mdij   1 mdji G(mdij;mdji)
+
 
1 mdij
   1 mdji X
k 6=i;j
ik G(mdik;mdki)
   1 mdij mdij X
k 6=i;j
jk G(mdjk;mdkj) (19)
for i; j = 1; 2;    ; N: Thus, the dynamics of the system are described in terms
of mdij (i; j = 1; 2;    ; N) only. Before analyzing the general model with any
population, to provide intuition we rst examine the two person case. This
system, with analogous equations for agent j, represents a partner dance on
the vertices of the Hilbert cube.
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3 The Two Person Model
3.1 Equilibrium Dynamics
Consider N = 2 and we call the two agents i and j. Applying (18) to the
present context and setting ii = 1  ij and jj = 1  ji yields
_yi
yi
=
_ni
ni
= (1  ij)  + ij G(mdij;mdji) (20)
_yj
yj
=
_nj
nj
= (1  ji)  + ji G(mdji;mdij)
Likewise, by omitting the last two lines in equation (19) and setting ii = 1 ij
and jj = 1  ji = 1  ij (since ij = ji in equilibrium), we have
_mdij = (1  ij)   
 
1 mdij
   1 mdij  mdji
 ij mdij 
 
1 mdji
 G(mdij;mdji) (21)
_mdji = (1  ij)   
 
1 mdji
   1 mdij  mdji
 ji mdji 
 
1 mdij

G(mdji;m
d
ij)
The general two person system, allowing asymmetric situations, is studied
in detail in Berliant and Fujita (2006). To provide intuition, here we focus on
the special case where the initial state is symmetric, namelymdij(0) = m
d
ji(0) =
m(0). It should be clear from these equations that once the general system
attains a symmetric state, say at time 0, then in equilibrium the state remains
symmetric forever.10 Along any symmetric equilibrium path,
mdij = m
d
ji = m
mc = 1 m
Hence the state of the system is completely specied by the scalar m, repre-
senting the percentage of the total number of ideas exclusive to each person.
To study this system in greater detail, we must study whether each person
does better creating new ideas in isolation or together. Setting
yi = yj = y
10Berliant and Fujita (2006) show that there is a large set of initial conditions from which
the equilibrium process reaches a symmetric state in nite time.
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we use (20) to obtain
_y(t)
y(t)
= [1  ij(t)]  + ij(t) G(m(t);m(t))
To simplify notation, we dene the growth rate when the two persons meet,
ji = ij = 1, as
g(m)  G(m;m) =   [(1  2m) m
2]
1
3
1 m (22)
Thus
_y(t)
y(t)
= [1  ij]  + ij  g(m) (23)
In order to maximize the income growth rate given by (23), both agents want
to meet (i.e., ij = ji = 1) when
g(m) > 
Thus, the meeting between agents i and j actually occurs when this inequality
holds.
Figure 1 illustrates the graph of the function g(m) as a bold line for  = 1.
FIGURE 1 GOES HERE
Di¤erentiating g(m) yields
g0(m) =

3

(1  2m) m2
(1 m)3
  2
3
 m  (2  5m)
(1 m)4 (24)
implying that
g0(m)
>
<
0 as m
<
>
2
5
for m 2 (0; 1
2
) (25)
Thus, g(m) is strictly quasi-concave on [0; 1
2
], achieving its maximal value
at mB = 2
5
; we call the latter the Bliss Point. Presuming that g(mB) > , it
is the point where the rate of increase in income is maximized for each person.
Dene the set of states where meetings occur to be
M = fm 2 [0; 1
2
] j g(m) > g
Since g is strictly quasi-concave, M is convex. Let mJ be the greatest lower
bound ofM and letmI be the least upper bound ofM . HenceM = (mJ ;mI);
see Figure 1. WheneverM 6= ;,mB 2M , somJ < 2=5 (as long as g(mB) > ).
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In fact we can describe the properties of the set M in general. As 
increases, the productivity of creating ideas alone increases, so people are less
likely to want to meet to create new ideas, implying that M shrinks as 
increases. If  is a little more than   (4=9) 13 , M disappears.
Next we discuss the dynamics of the system, assuming that the equilibrium
condition ij = ji =  always holds. Consider rst the case where there is
no meeting, so  = 0 is xed exogenously. Then from equations (21), the
dynamics are given by the following equation:
_m =   (1 m)(1  2m)
If there is no meeting ( = 0), then _m is non-negative, and positive on
(0; 1=2). So if there is no meeting, the vector eld points to the right, and the
system tends to m = 1=2.
With a meeting,  = 1. Then (21) implies:
_m =  m    [(1  2m) m2] 13 (26)
This expression is negative on (0; 1=2) and the vector eld points to the left.
The sink is at 0, so the system eventually moves there under the assumption
of a meeting.
Next, we combine the case where there is no meeting (ij = 0) with the
case where there is a meeting (ij = 1), and let the agents choose whether or
not to meet. The model follows the dynamics for meetings (ij = 1) on M
and the dynamics for no meetings (ij = 0) on the complement of M .
The state m = 1=2 is a stable point of the system; the myopic return to no
meeting dominates the return to meeting, since the two persons have little in
common. This stable point, however, is not very interesting.
We have not completely specied the dynamics. This is especially impor-
tant on the boundary of M (namely mI and mJ), where people are indi¤erent
between meeting and not meeting. We take an arbitrarily small unit of time,
t, and assume that if both people become indi¤erent between meeting and
not meeting, but the two persons are currently meeting, then the meeting
must continue for at least t units of time. Similarly, if the two persons are
not meeting when both people become indi¤erent between meeting and not
meeting, then they cannot meet for at least t units of time. So if people be-
come indi¤erent between meeting or not meeting at time t, the function ij(t)
cannot change its value until time t + t. Finally, when at least one person
initially happens to be on the boundary of M (that is, at least one person is
14
indi¤erent between meeting and not meeting), then they cannot meet for at
least t units of time. Under this set of rules, we can be more specic about
the dynamic process near the boundary of M .
In terms of dynamics, if the system does not evolve toward the uninteresting
stable point where there are no meetings (and the two people have nothing in
common), eventually the system reaches the point mJ . It is the remaining
stable point of our model. Small movements around mJ will continue due
to our assumption about the dynamics at the boundary of M , namely that
meetings or isolation are sticky. As t! 0, the process converges to the point
mJ . The point mJ features symmetry between the two agents with a large
degree of homogeneity relative to the remainder of the points in M and the
other points in [0; 1=2] generally.
So given various initial compositions of knowledge m(0), where will the
system end up? If the initial composition of knowledge is such that the couple
has little in common, namely m(0)  mI , the sink will be m = 1=2. If the
initial composition of knowledge is such that the couple has more in common,
namely m(0) < mI , then the sink point will be m = mJ .
The point mJ < 2=5 exists and is unique as long as M 6= ;.
Without loss of generality, we can allow ij to take values in [0; 1] rather
than in f0; 1g. The interpretation of a fractional ij is that at each instant
of time, a person divides their time between a meeting ij proportion of that
instant and isolation (1 ij) proportion of that instant.11 The purpose of this
generalization is to capture the limit of a sequence of dance patterns where
two partners are alternating between working together and then in isolation
for shorter and shorter periods. All of our results concerning the model when
ij is restricted to f0; 1g carry over to the case where ij 2 [0; 1]. The reason
is that except on the boundary of M , persons strictly prefer ij 2 f0; 1g to
fractional values of ij, as each persons objective function is linear in ij. On
the boundary of M , our rule concerning dynamics prevents ij from taking on
fractional values, as it must retain its value from the previous iteration of the
process for at least time t > 0. So if the process pierces the boundary from
inside M , it must retain ij = 1 for an additional time of at least t. If it
pierces the boundary from outside M , it must retain ij = 0 for an additional
time of at least t. As t ! 0, the process converges to the point mJ in
nite time.
11An alternative interpretation is that at each instant of time, they devote their attention
to working together for ij proportion of that instant and to working in isolation for (1 ij)
proportion of that instant.
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It may seem trivial to allow fractional ij when discussing equilibrium be-
havior with two people, but allowing fractional ij is crucial to Section 4, where
we consider the general case.
3.2 E¢ ciency
To construct an analog of Pareto e¢ ciency for this model, we use a social
planner who can choose whether or not people should meet in each time period.
As noted above, we shall allow the social planner to choose values of ij in [0; 1],
so that persons can be required to meet for a percentage of the total time in a
period, and not meet for the remainder of the period. The feasibility condition
ij = ji is imposed for all paths considered. To avoid dependence of our notion
of e¢ ciency on a discount rate, we employ the following alternative concepts.
The rst is stronger than the second. A path of ij is a measurable function of
time (on [0;1)) taking values in [0; 1]. For each path of ij, there corresponds
a unique time path of mdij determined by equation (21), respecting the initial
condition, and thus a unique time path of income yi(t; ij). We say that a path
0ij (strictly) dominates a path ij if
yi(t; 
0
ij)  yi(t; ij) and yj(t; 0ij)  yj(t; ij) for all t  0
with strict inequality for at least one person over a positive interval of time. As
this concept is quite strong, and thus di¢ cult to use as an e¢ ciency criterion,
it will sometimes be necessary to employ a weaker concept, which we discuss
next. We say that a path ij is overtaken by a path 
0
ij if there exists a t
0 such
that
yi(t; 
0
ij)  yi(t; ij) and yj(t; 0ij)  yj(t; ij) for all t > t0
with strict inequality for at least one person over a positive interval of time.
We defer discussion of additional e¢ ciency criteria using the intertemporal
utilitarian welfare function to Appendix 3.
Once again, for e¢ ciency analysis, we consider only symmetric equilibrium
paths (namely with mij(t) = mji(t) for all t 2 R+); if the system is started
with symmetric initial conditions, they are maintained over all time.
Two sink points were analyzed in the last subsection. First consider equi-
librium paths that have mJ as the sink point; they reach mJ in nite time and
stay there. Using Figure 1, we will construct a symmetric alternative path 0ij
that dominates the equilibrium path ij.
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Let t0 be the time at which the equilibrium path reaches mJ . Let the plan-
ner set 0ij(t) = ij(t) for t  t0, taking the same path as the equilibrium path
until t0. At time t0, the planner takes 0ij(t) = 0 until m
I is attained, prohibit-
ing meetings so that the dancers can prot from ideas created in isolation.
Then the planner sets 0ij(t) = 1 until m
J is attained, permitting meetings
and the development of more knowledge in common. The last two phases are
repeated as necessary.
From Figure 1, the income paths yi(t; 
0
ij) and yj(t; 
0
ij) generated by the
path 0ij clearly dominate the income paths yi(t; ij) and yj(t; ij) generated by
the equilibrium path ij. Thus, the equilibrium is far from the most productive
path in the two person model.
Other dominating paths can be generated by altering this example. For
instance, the path in the example above could be replicated until reaching mB
for the rst time, followed by alternating rapidly between joint work and work
in isolation to stay close to mB. Notice that when the persons are working
in isolation, their productivity is low. Hence, it is not clear which path, the
original path that cycles or one that tries to maintain a position near mB,
generates higher welfare in the context of the sum of discounted felicity. To
determine which is more e¢ cient, it would be necessary to introduce a discount
rate; we avoid that complication here.
Next consider equilibrium paths ij(t) that end in sink point 1=2. Our
dominance criterion cannot be used in this situation, since in potentially dom-
inating plans, the planner will need to force the couple to meet outside of region
M in Figure 1 in early time periods. During this time interval, the dancers
could do better by not meeting, and thus a comparison of the income derived
from the paths would rely on the discount rate, something we are trying to
avoid. So we will use our weaker criterion here, that of overtaking.
Given an equilibrium path ij(t) with sink point 1=2, the planner can con-
struct an overtaking path 0ij(t) in a manner analogous to the construction of
a dominating path for paths that end in sink point mJ .
The most productive state mB is characterized by less homogeneity than
the stable point mJ . However, in the present context of two persons, it is
not possible to maintain mB while achieving the highest growth rate g(mB).
For maintaining mB requires the social planner to force the two persons not
to meet some of the time, leading to an income growth rate strictly between 
and g(mB). Thus, it will be surprising to see in the next section that when N
is large enough, the equilibrium process will converge to the most productive
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state and maintain it for a large set of initial conditions.
4 Equilibrium Dynamics
4.1 The General Framework
The model with only two people is very limited. Either two people are meeting
or they are each working in isolation. With more people, the dancers can be
partitioned into many pairs of dance partners. Within each pair, the two
dancers are working together, but pairs of partners are working simultaneously.
This creates more possibilities in our model, as the knowledge created within
a dance pair is not known to other pairs. Thus, knowledge di¤erentiation can
evolve between di¤erent pairs of dance partners. Furthermore, the option of
switching partners is now available.
We limit ourselves to the case where N is divisible by 4. This is a square
dance on the vertices of the Hilbert cube. When the population is not divisible
by 4, our most useful tool, symmetry, cannot be used to examine dynamics.
Although this may seem restrictive, whenN is large, asymmetries apply only to
a small fraction of the population, and thus become negligible.12 In the general
case, we impose the assumption of pairwise symmetric initial heterogeneity
conditions for all agents.
The initial state of knowledge is symmetric among the dancers, and given
by
ncij(0) = n
c(0) for all i 6= j (27)
ndij(0) = n
d(0) for all i 6= j (28)
At the initial state, each pair of dancers has the same number of ideas, nc(0),
in common. Moreover, for any pair of dancers, the number of ideas that one
dancer knows but the other does not know is the same and equal to nd(0).
Given that the initial state of knowledge is symmetric among the four dancers,
it turns out that the equilibrium conguration at any time also maintains the
basic symmetry among the dancers.13
12See footnote 18 for further discussion of this point.
13It is possible that, beginning from an initial state that is asymmetric, there are asym-
metric equilibria in the general case of an arbitrary number of people. (Beginning with an
initial state that is symmetric, asymmetric equilibria are impossible.) Our clues about the
possibility of asymmetric equilibria come from the two person case, as detailed in Section 3.
Analyzing asymmetric equilibria in the general case seems intractable.
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When all dancers are pairwise symmetric to each other, that is, when
mdij = m
d
ji for all i 6= j (29)
using the function g dened by (22), the income growth rate (18) is simplied
as
_yi
yi
=
_ni
ni
= ii  +
X
j 6=i
ij  g(mdij) (30)
and the dynamics (19) can be rewritten as
_mdij
1 mdij
=   ii   1 mdij  jj mdij  ij mdij  g(mdij)
+
 
1 mdij
 X
k 6=i;j
ik  g(mdik) mdij 
X
k 6=i;j
jk  g(mdjk) (31)
Next, taking the case of N = 4, we illustrate the possible meetings, noting
that the equilibrium path species a meeting for every time. Figure 2 gives the
possibilities at any xed time for N = 4. Given that the initial state of knowl-
edge is symmetric among the four dancers, as noted above, the equilibrium
conguration at any time also maintains the basic symmetry among dancers.
FIGURE 2 GOES HERE
Panel (a) in Figure 2 represents the case in which each of the four dancers is
working alone, creating new ideas in isolation. Panels (b-1) to (b-3) represent
the three possible congurations of partner dancing, in which two couples each
dance separately but simultaneously. In panel (b-1), for example, 1 and 2 dance
together. At the same time, 3 and 4 dance together.
Although panels (a) to (b-3) represent the basic forms of dance with four
persons, it turns out that the equilibrium path often requires a mixture of these
basic forms. That is, on the equilibrium path, people wish to change partners
as frequently as possible. The purpose is to balance the number of di¤erent
and common ideas with partners as best as can be achieved. This suggests a
square dance with rapidly changing partners on the equilibrium path.
Please refer to panels (c-1) to (c-3) in Figure 2. Each of these panels
represents square dancing where a dancer rotates through two xed partners
as fast as possible in order to maximize the instantaneous increase in their
income. In panel (c-1), for example, dancer 1 chooses dancers 2 and 3 as
partners, and rotates between the two partners under equilibrium values of
12 and 13 such that 12 + 13 = 1. In the case where 12 = 13 = 1=2,
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for example, this means in practice that person 1 works with person 2 for
half a week and with person 3 for half a week. This can be the best of two
worlds: it can achieve high knowledge productivity through cooperation while
it simultaneously avoids accumulating too much knowledge in common with
any particular partner. Dancers 2, 3 and 4 behave analogously. In order for
this type of square dance to take place, of course, all four persons must agree to
follow this pattern.14 Finally, panel (d) depicts square dancing in which each
dancer rotates though all three possible partners as fast as possible. That is,
for all i 6= j, ij 2 (0; 1), and for all i, ii = 0 and
P
j 6=i ij = 1.
At this point, it is useful to remind the reader that we are using a myopic
core concept to determine equilibrium at each point in time. In fact, it is
necessary to sharpen that concept in the model with N persons. When there
is more than one vector of strategies that is in the myopic core at a particular
time, namely more than one vector of joint strategies implies the same, high-
est rst derivative of income for all persons, the one with the highest second
derivative of income is selected. The justication for this assumption is that
at each point in time, people are attempting to maximize the ow of income.
The formal denition of the myopic core and proof that it is nonempty can be
found in Appendix 0. Although the theorem in the appendix is general, in
the remainder of this paper we shall focus on the symmetric case.
Now we are ready to investigate the actual equilibrium path, depending on
the given initial composition of knowledge,
mdij(0) = m
d(0) =
nd(0)
nc(0) + 2nd(0)
which is common for all pairs i and j (i 6= j). In Figure 1, let mJ and mI be
dened on the horizontal axis at the left intersection and the right intersection
between the g(m) curve and the horizontal line at height , respectively.
4.2 The Main Result
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that
 < g(mB) (32)
so as to avoid the trivial case of all agents always working in isolation.
Figure 3 provides a diagram explaining our main result.
14In square dancing terminology, this is the call.
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FIGURE 3 GOES HERE
The top horizontal line represents the initial common state md(0), while
the bottom horizontal line represents the nal common state or sink point,
md(1). There are four regions of the initial state that result in four di¤erent
sink points. Corresponding to each initial region, the associated equilibrium
dance forms are illustrated by taking the case with N = 4. To be precise:15
Proposition 1: Assume that N is a multiple of 4. The equilibrium path
and sink point depend discontinuously on the initial condition, md(0). The
pattern of interaction between persons and the sink point as a function of the
initial condition are given in Figure 3 and as follows.
(i) For 0 < md(0)  2=5 = mB, the equilibrium path consists of an initial
time interval (possibly the empty set) in which all N persons work indepen-
dently, followed by an interval in which all persons work with another but trade
partners as rapidly as possible (with ij = 1=(N 1) for all i and for all j 6= i).
When the bliss point, 2=5, is attained, the agents split into groups of 4, and
they remain at the bliss point.16
(ii) When mB < md(0)  bm, where bm is dened by (52), the equilibrium
path consists of three phases. First, the N persons are paired arbitrarily and
work with their partners for a nonempty interval of time. Second, they switch
to new partners and work with their new partners for a nonempty interval of
time. Finally, each person works alternately with the two partners with whom
they worked in the rst two phases, but not with a person with whom they have
not worked previously. The sink point is 1=3.
(iii) For bm < md(0)  mI , the equilibrium path pairs the N persons into
15At this point, it is useful to recall the following notation. In any symmetric situation, the
percentage of ideas known by one agent but not another is given by mJ for the lowest value
at which meetings are desirable, mI for the highest value at which meetings are desirable,
and mB for the bliss point or the maximal productivity of a meeting.
16The conguration of workers necessary to maintain the bliss point is not unique. Each
dancer must have 3 links to other dancers, communicating with each for an equal share of
time. For example, groups of 4 may form, where each worker within a group communicates
equally with every other worker in that group. However, it is also possible to have, say,
groups of six forming. With such groups, each dancer has communication links to only
three other dancers within their group. So not all possible links within a group are actually
active. If groups at the bliss point are larger, then their communication structure must
become more sparse to maintain the bliss point. The minimal size of groups that coalesce
at the bliss point is clearly 4. Nevertheless, all of the calculations apply independent of the
size of groups that form at the bliss point. The same remarks apply to the various cases
detailed below, except when dancers are in isolation.
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N=2 couples arbitrarily, and each person dances exclusively with the same part-
ner forever. The sink point is mJ .17
(iv) For mI < md(0)  1=2, each person dances alone forever. The sink
point is 1=2.
4.2.1 Case (i): 0 < md(0)  2=5 = mB
First suppose that the initial state is such that
mJ < md(0)  mB
Then, since g(mdij(0)) = g
 
md(0)

>  for any possible dance pairs consisting
of i and j, no person wishes to dance alone at the start. However, since the
value of g(mdij(0)) is the same for all possible pairs, all forms of (b-1) to (d)
in Figure 2 are possible equilibrium dance congurations at the start. To
determine which one of them will actually take place on the equilibrium path,
we must consider the second derivative of income for all persons.
In general, consider any time at which all persons have the same composi-
tion of knowledge:
mdij = m
d for all i 6= j (33)
where
g(md) > 
Focus on person i; the equations for other persons are analogous. Since person
i does not wish to dance alone, it follows that
ii = 0 and
X
j 6=i
ij = 1 (34)
Substituting (33) and (34) into (30) yields
_yi
yi
= g(md)
Likewise, substituting (33) and (34) into (31) and arranging terms gives
_mdij =
 
1 md  g(md)  1  2md   (1 md)  ij (35)
Since the income growth rate _y=y above is independent of the values of
ij (j 6= i), in order to examine what values of ij(j 6= i) person i wishes to
17As in the two person case, once mJ is attained, the couples split and dance alone
frequently in order to maintain state mJ .
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choose, we must consider the time derivative of _yi=yi. In doing so, however,
we cannot use equation (30) because the original variables have been replaced.
Instead, we must go back to the original equation (18). Then, using equations
(33) to (35) and setting ij = ji (which must hold for any feasible meeting),
we obtain the following (see Technical Appendix b for proof):
d ( _yi=yi)
dt
=
 
1 md  g(md)  g0(md)  "1  2md   (1 md) X
j 6=i
2ij
#
(36)
Now, suppose that
md < mB  2=5
and hence g0(md) > 0. Then, in order to maximize the time derivative of the
income growth rate, person i must solve the following quadratic minimization
problem:
min
X
j 6=i
2ij subject to
X
j 6=i
ij = 1 (37)
which yields the solution for person i:
ij =
1
N   1 for all j 6= i (38)
Although we have focused on person i, the vector of optimal strategies is
the same for all persons. Thus, all persons agree to a square dance in which
each person rotates through all N   1 possible partners while sharing the time
equally.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The condition md < 2=5 
mB means that the dancers have relatively too many ideas in common, and
thus they wish to acquire ideas that are di¤erent from those of each possible
partner as fast as possible. That is, when mJ < mdij = m
d < mB in Figure
1, each dancer wishes to move the knowledge composition mdij to the right as
quickly as possible, thus increasing the growth rate g(mdij) as fast as possible.
Taking the case of N = 4 and using Figure 2, let us consider how this objective
can be achieved in a cooperative manner.
Given that mJ < mdij = m
d < mB and thus  < g(mdij), dance form (a)
in which everyone is dancing alone is out of the question. Dancing alone
achieves only the growth rate  less than g(mdij); the latter could be achieved
by dancing with any other person. Dance in the form (b-1), where f1; 2g
and f3; 4g respectively dance exclusively with one partner, is possible. In
this manner, however, each pair just accumulates more knowledge in common,
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pushing md12 and m
d
34 to the left in Figure 1. Indeed, setting 12 = 1 and
34 = 1 in (35) yields
_md12 = _m
d
34 =  (1 md)  g(md) md < 0,
working against the objective of increasing the myopic growth rate g(mdij).
Observe that when partners dance in form (b-1), the actual pair f1; 2g accu-
mulates more ideas in common. But from the view point of dancers 1 and
2, dancers 3 and 4 are accumulating new ideas that are di¤erent. Consider,
for example, the potential partners 1 and 3, who are not dancing together at
present and hence 13 = 0. From (35) we have
_md13 = (1 md)  g(md)  (1  2md) > 0
Since g is monotonically increasing on the domain
 
mJ ; 2=5

, the value g(md12)
of the actual dance partnership f1; 2g is decreasing with time, while the value
g(md12) of the potential partnership f1; 3g is increasing with time. Hence, given
the symmetric situation of the four dancers, everyone wants to change partners
immediately.
This suggests that when mJ < mdij = m
d < 2=5 (= mB) for all i 6= j, on
the equilibrium path, agents perform a square dance with rapidly changing
partners represented by one of panels (c-1) to (d) in Figure 2. Actually, we
can show that the square dance congurations (c-1) to (c-3) cannot occur on
the equilibrium path. For example, suppose that a dance in the form of panel
(c-1) occurs, where 12 = 13 = 1=2, 14 = 0 and so forth. Then, equation (35)
yields
_md14 = (1 md)  g(md)  (1  2md)
> _md12 = _m
d
13 = (1 md)  g(md) 
1  3md
2
Thus, dancer 1 wants to change partners from 2 and 3 to 4 immediately. There-
fore, when mJ < mdij = m
d < 2=5 (= mB) for all i 6= j, on the equilibrium
path, only conguration (d) in Figure 2 can take place, where ij = 1=3 for all
i 6= j.
Returning to the general case with N  4, when mJ < md(0) = mdji(0) <
2=5 (= mB) for all i 6= j, on the equilibrium path, the square dance with ij =
1= (N   1) for all i 6= j takes place at the start. Then, since the symmetric
condition (33) holds thenceforth, the same square dance will continue as long
as mJ < md < 2=5 (= mB). The dynamics of this square dance are as follows.
The creation of new ideas always takes place in pairs. Pairs are cycling rapidly
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with ij = 1= (N   1) for all i 6= j. Dancer 1, for example, spends 1= (N   1)
of each period with dancer 2, for example, and (N   2) = (N   1) of the time
dancing with other partners. Setting mdij = m
d and ij = 1= (N   1) in (35),
we obtain
_md = (1 md)  g(md)  (N   2)  (2N   3)m
d
N   1 (39)
Setting _md = 0 and considering that md < 1, we obtain the sink point
md =
N   2
2N   3 (40)
Surprisingly, when N = 4, md = 2=5 = mB. The value of _md is positive
when md < mB = 2=5, and zero if md = 2=5. Hence, beginning at any point
md(0) < 2=5, the system moves to the right, eventually settling at the bliss
point mB.
Since the right hand side of equation (40) is increasing in N ,
md =
N   2
2N   3 > 2=5  m
B when N > 4. (41)
Hence, when N > 4 and N is divisible by 4, beginning at any point mJ <
md(0) < 2=5, the system moves to the right and reaches mB = 2=5 in nite
time. When N agents reach the bliss point mB, they break into groups of 4 to
maintain heterogeneity at the bliss point.18
Next, when 0  md(0) < mJ , it is obvious that the four persons work alone
until they reach mJ .19 Then they follow the path explained above, eventually
reaching mB.
18When the number of agents is not divisible by 4, then the bliss point cannot be main-
tained for the unlucky N   ~N persons, where ~N is the largest number divisible by 4 and
not exceeding N . Given that our game does not permit any side payments, these unlucky
persons have no choice but to do the best by themselves. When N   ~N = 3, the unlucky 3
persons perform a square dance in which they set ij = 1=3 for i 6= j. Substituting 3 for N
in (39) yields
_md =
 
1 md  g(md)  1  3md
2
Thus, starting from the bliss point, the unlucky 3 persons eventually settle at md = 1=3.
When N   ~N = 2, substituting 2 for N in (39) yields
_md =    1 md  g(md) md
Hence, starting from the bliss point, the unlucky 2 persons gradually move to mJ and stay
there. Finally, when N   ~N = 1, this unlucky person dances in solo forever starting from
the bliss point. As N becomes larger, however, the fraction of agents for whom the bliss
point cannot be maintained becomes small.
19Movement to the right beyond mJ requires application of the second order conditions
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4.2.2 Case (ii): mB < md(0)  bm 20
Next, let us consider the dynamics of the system when it begins to the
right of mB = 2=5 but to the left of bm < mI (where bm will be dened soon).
For example, consider md0 in Figure 4, where the g(m) curve from Figure 1
is duplicated in the top part of Figure 4. In other words, the initial state
reects a higher degree of heterogeneity than the bliss point. In this case, the
equilibrium process progresses through the following three phases (please refer
to the sequence of dance forms (b-1), (b-2) and (c-1), leading to md(1) =
1=3 in the middle of Figure 4).
FIGURE 4 GOES HERE
Phase 1: Since the initial state reects a higher degree of heterogeneity
than the bliss point, the dancers want to increase the knowledge they have in
common as fast as possible, leading to delity and couple dances.
To be precise, since mdij(0) = m
d(0) for all i 6= j and g(md(0)) > , the
situation at time 0 is the same as that in Case (i) except that we now have
md(0) > mB. Hence, focusing on person i as before, the time derivative of
_yi=yi at time 0 is given by (36). However, since g0(md) = g0(md(0)) < 0 at
time 0, in order to maximize the right hand side of equation (36), person i now
must solve now the following quadratic maximization problem:
max
X
j 6=i
2ij subject to
X
j 6=i
ij = 1 (42)
Thus, person i wishes to choose any partner, say k, and set ik = 1, whereas
ij = 0 for all j 6= k. The situation is the same for all dancers. Hence, without
loss of generality, we can assume that N persons agree at time 0 to form the
following combination of partnerships:
P1  ff1; 2g ; f3; 4g f5; 6g ;    ; fN   1; Ngg (43)
and initiate pairwise dancing such that21
ij = ji = 1 for fi; jg 2 P1, ij = ji = 0 for fi; jg =2 P1 (44)
for equilibrium selection. When the dancers are exactly at mJ , the rate of growth in income
from working in isolation and from working with all other dancers with equal intensity are
the same, so the derivatives of the respective growth rates of income must be examined to
determine which is chosen.
20Please note that we have not yet dened bm. Its denition will appear soon.
21Here we adopt the convention that fi; jg 2 P1 means either fi; jg 2 P1 or fj; ig 2 P1,
whereas fi; jg =2 P1 means neither fi; jg 2 P1 nor fj; ig 2 P1.
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In order to examine the dynamics for this pairwise dance, let us focus on the
partnership f1; 2g 2 P1; the equations for other partnerships are analogous.
Since 12 = 21 = 1 and 1k = 2k = 0 for all k 6= 1; 2, setting i = 1 and
j = 2 in (31) yields
_md12 =  
 
1 md12
 md12  g(md12) < 0 (45)
This means, as expected, that the proportion of di¤erential knowledge for
each couple decreases with time. Since the dynamics _mdij and the initial point
mdij(0) = m
d(0) are the same for all fi; jg 2 P1, as long as the same pairwise
dancing continues, we have that
md12(t) = m
d
34(t) =    = mdN 1;N(t)  mda(t) < md(0) (46)
where the subscript a in mda means any actual partnership.
To study how long the same pairwise dance can continue, let us focus on a
shadow partnership f1; 3g =2 P1, which is just a potential partnership for person
1. Since 12 = 34 = 1 under the present pairwise dance, whereas 1k = 0 for
k 6= 2, setting i = 1 and j = 3 in (31) and using md12 = md34 yields
_md13 =
 
1 md13
   1  2md13  g(md12) > 0 (47)
implying that the proportion of the di¤erential knowledge increases for any
pair of persons who are not dancing together. By symmetry, as long as the
same pairwise dancing continues, we have that
md(0) < mds(t)  md13(t) = md24(t) =    = mdij(t) for all fi; jg =2 P1 (48)
where the subscript s in mds means any shadow partnership. Since g(m) is
decreasing at md(0) > mB, (46) and (48) together mean that the following
relationship holds at least initially:
g(mda(t)) > g(m
d(0)) > g(mds(t)) (49)
Hence, the pairwise dance P1 will continue at least for a while.
To examine exactly how long the same pairwise dance will continue, let us
focus on person 1 again. To see if person 1 continues to dance with person 2
or if person 1 wishes to switch to shadow partner 3, we take the ratio of (45)
to (47) at time t > 0. Following calculations we obtain:
  _md12(t)
_md13(t)
> 2 when md12(t) >
2
5
 mB
27
The important implication is that md12(t) is decreasing at a rate more than
twice the speed of increase of md13(t), at least initially. Provided that m
d(0) is
su¢ ciently close to 2=5, eventually there will be a time t0 such that g(md12(t
0)) =
g(md13(t
0)) and partners change from f1; 2g and f3; 4g to, for example, f1; 3g
and f2; 4g.
Indeed, focusing on an actual partnership f1; 2g and a shadow partnership
f1; 3g, we can show the following (see Appendix 1 for a proof of the next
result):
Assuming symmetry of initial conditions for N persons, suppose that 2=5 <
md(0) < mI . If initial partnerships are given by P1 in (43), and the same
partnerships are maintained, then there exists a time t0 such that for t > 0,
g(md12(t))
>
<
g(md13(t)) as t
<
>
t0 (50)
There is a unique the switching time t0 as a function ofmd(0), which is denoted
by ts

md(0)

. Denoting
md12
 
ts

md(0)
  md12 md(0) , md13  ts md(0)  md13 md(0)
and using the equality in (50) we have the switching position as follows:
md13

md(0)

=
2
5
+
 
md(0)  2
5
  
1 md(0)
md(0)2
h
2 

1
md(0)
  2

4  1
md(0)
i (51)
In Figure 4, we draw the md13

md(0)

curve in the bottom part (using a bold
line). For illustration, we take md0 as the initial value of m
d(0) and, using the
real lines with arrows, we show in this diagram how to determine the switching
positions md13

md0

and md12

md0

.
Let m^ be the critical value of md(0) such that
md13 [m^] = m
I (52)
Using Figure 4, we can readily show that 2=5 < m^ < mI . Suppose that
2=5 < md(0)  bm. Then, under the partnership f1; 2g and f3; 4g, it holds
that
g
 
md12(t)

> g
 
md13(t)

>  for 0 < t < t0
and hence partnerships f1; 2g and f3; 4g continue until time t0. However, if
they maintained the same partnerships longer, then
g
 
md12(t)

< g
 
md13(t)

for t > t0
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This implies that the original partnership cannot be continued beyond time
t0, and suggests that the dancers switch to the new partnerships. Since all
other potential partners are indistinguishable, as shown in Appendix 2, a single
dance partner is chosen from those not used in the rst phase, and this dance
continues for some time.
Two examples of new equilibrium partnerships at time t0 are given by
P2  ff1; 3g ; f2; 4g ; f5; 7g ; f6; 8g ;    ; fN   3; N   1g ; fN   2; Ngg (53)
and
P 02  ffN; 1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 5g ;    ; fN   2; N   1gg (54)
There exist many other possibilities for equilibrium partnerships to be cho-
sen by N dancers at time t0. It turns out, however, that the essential charac-
teristics of equilibrium dynamics are not a¤ected by this choice at time t0, as
explained at the end of this case.
Phase 2: Hence, let us assume that N persons agree to choose the new
partnerships P2 at time t0. It turns out, however, that these new partnerships
last only for a limited time (for details, see Appendix 2). To examine this
point, we focus on the dynamics of a four-person group, 1, 2, 3 and 4, where
the initial partnerships f1; 2g and f3; 4g switch to the new partnerships f1; 3g
and f2; 4g at time t0. Referring to Figure 4, at the switching time t0 the
new partnership f1; 3g is at state md13

md0

, whereas the former partnership
is at state md12

md0

. As the new partnerships mature, partners build up
knowledge in common, so md13 moves to the left from m
d
13

md0

, while the
former partnership f1; 2g builds up di¤erential knowledge since they are no
longer working together, somd12 moves to the right fromm
d
12

md0

. Eventually,
the values of the previous partnership f1; 2g and the current partnership f1; 3g
meet somewhere between md12

md0

and md13

md0

. Due to the shape of the
function g, the value of partnership f1; 3g moves up quickly relative to the
movement of shadow partnership f1; 2g up, so equality of the values of the two
partnerships is achieved to the left of B at a certain time t00. Let t00 be the
time at which md12(t) and m
d
13(t) become the same:
md12(t
00) = md13(t
00) (55)
Notice that although our focus has been on agent 1, our arguments are
applicable to all agents. So, for example, agents 3 and 4 dance in the rst
phase, whereas agents 2 and 4 dance in the second phase. At the end of the
second phase, the values of the four partnerships
f1; 2g; f1; 3g; f3; 4g and f2; 4g
29
are all the same, as are their states.
When equality (55) is achieved, partnerships f1; 4g and f2; 3g have never
coalesced, so these partners have little in common. Thus, in Figure 4, their
state is to the right of the initial state md12

md0

, so they will never coalesce.
Although we focus on the four person model, the same applies to any potential
partnership that never forms in the rst two phases. Thus the third phase
will involve only those partnerships realized in the rst two phases.
Analogous to the notation used for the rst switching time and position,
there is a unique switching time t00 as a function of md(0), which is denoted
by ets md(0). Analogous to the notation used for the rst switching position,
the second switching position is the unique state where md12(t) meets m
d
13(t),
which is dened by:
~md

md(0)
  md12  ~ts md(0) = md13  ~ts md(0) = md34  ~ts md(0) = md24  ~ts md(0)
(56)
Using the equality in (55), the switching position ~md

md(0)

is:
~md

md(0)

=
2
5
  m
d(0)  2
5
5md(0)  1 (57)
In Figure 4, the ~md

md(0)

curve is represented in the bottom part by a
bold, broken line. Takingmd0 as the initial value ofm
d(0), and using the broken
lines with arrows, we demonstrate how to determine the second switching
position ~md

md(0)

.
Phase 3: To see what form of dance will take place immediately after
the second switching time, observe that if partnerships f1; 3g and f2; 4g were
maintained beyond time t00, then it would follow that
g
 
md12(t)

> g
 
md13(t)

for t > t00 (58)
This implies that the same partnerships cannot be continued beyond t00. Fur-
thermore, notice that dancers cannot go back to the previous form of partner-
ships f1; 2g and f3; 4g. If they did so, then the proportion of the knowledge
in common for the actual partners f1; 2g would increase, while the proportion
of the di¤erential knowledge for the shadow partnership f1; 3g would increase.
This means that the following relationship,
md12(t) < m
d(t00) < md13(t) < m
B
holds immediately after t00, and thus
g
 
md12(t)

< g
 
md13(t)

(59)
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which contradicts the assumption that f1; 2g is the actual partnership. Fur-
thermore, since dancers 1 and 4 do not meet before t00, the following inequality
g
 
md13(t)

> g
 
md14(t)

(60)
holds immediately after t00. Thus, immediately after time t00, the equilib-
rium dance cannot include partnerships f1; 4g and f2; 3g. Hence, provided
that g(1=3) > , we can see from Figure 2 that the only possible equilib-
rium conguration immediately after t00 is a square dance in the form (c-
1), involving a rapid rotation of non-diagonal partnerships, f1; 2g, f1; 3g,
f2; 4g and f3; 4g. That is, for dancer 1, 11 = 0 and 1j = 12 if j = 2
or 3, 14 = 0.22 Analogous expressions hold for all other four-person groups,
f5; 6; 7; 8g ;    ; fN   3; N   2; N   1; Ng.
The dynamics for this square dance are as follows. We set
mdij  md for fi; jg 2 P2 (61)
Then, since conditions (33) and (34) hold also in the present context, setting
ij = 1=2 in (35), we get
_md = (1 md)  g(md)  1  3m
d
2
(62)
which is negative when md > 1
3
, and zero if md = 1
3
. Thus, beginning at any
point md(t00) > 1
3
, the system moves to the left, eventually settling at md = 1
3
.
We can readily show that, along the path above, relation (60) holds for all
t  t00 where md13(t)  md(t).
It is interesting to observe that, in the entire equilibrium process starting
with the symmetric state of knowledge such that mdij(0) = m
d(0) > mB for
all i 6= j, partnerships f1; 4g and f2; 3g, for example, never coalesce. That
is, given that the proportion of di¤erential knowledge for all pairs of dancers
at the start exceeds the most productive point mB, they try to increase the
proportion of knowledge in common as quickly as possible through partner
dancing. These initial stages of building up knowledge in common through
partner dancing, however, divide all possible pairs of partners, who were sym-
metric at the start, into two heterogenous groups: those pairs that developed
a su¢ cient proportion of knowledge in common through actual meetings, and
those pairs that increased further the proportion of exclusive knowledge be-
cause they did not have a chance to work together. Since the latter group of
22Similar to Case (i), this result can also be obtained from the second order condition for
equilibrium selection.
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potential partners is excluded from the square dance in the last stage, the equi-
librium process of the four-person system ends up with a state of knowledge
that is less than the most productive state.
Finally, we may note that there exist many di¤erent structures of equilib-
rium partnerships to be chosen at time t0. However, the choice does not a¤ect,
in the following two stages, the dynamics of md (the proportion of di¤erential
knowledge, common to all active partnerships). Indeed, choosing in Phase 2
either partnerships P2 or P 02, in Phase 3 each person wants to dance with the
two partners whom the person met in the previous two stages. Thus, whether
P2 or P 02 is chosen at time t
0, the dynamics of md are the same in the last two
stages.
4.2.3 Case (iii): bm < md(0)  mI
Next supposemd(0) is such that m^ < md(0)  mI . As in Case (ii), dancers are
more heterogeneous than at the bliss point, so they would like to increase the
knowledge they hold in common through couple dancing, for example using
conguration (b-1) in Figure 2. The initial phase of Case (iii) is the same as the
initial phase of Case (ii). However, using (51), we know that md13[m
d(0)] > mI .
Thus, g
 
md12(t)

> g
 
md13(t)

for all t before md12(t) reaches m
J , whereas
g
 
md12(t)

>  > g
 
md13(t)

when md12(t) reaches m
J . So each dancer keeps
their original partner as the system climbs up to B and on to J . When the
system reaches md(t) = mJ , each dancer uses fractional ij to attain mJ by
switching between working in isolation and dancing with their original partner.
4.2.4 Case (iv): mI < md(0)  1=2
Finally, suppose md(0) > mI . Then, g
 
md(0)

< , and hence there is no
reason for anyone to form a partnership. Thus, each person dances alone
forever, and eventually reaches md = 1=2.
Compiling all four cases, the Main Result follows.
There are important remarks to be made about our Main Result. First,
the sink point changes discontinuously with changes in the initial conditions.
Second, from each set of initial conditions, the N persons eventually divide
into many separate groups between which no interaction occurs.23 Thus, from
an initial state that is symmetric, we obtain an equilibrium path featuring
asymmetry.
23Of course, Case (i) is the most interesting of these.
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5 E¢ ciency: The General Case
Next we consider the welfare properties of the equilibrium path. We examine
each of the cases enumerated above, beginning with Case (iii). This Case is
quite analogous to the two person model with sink point mJ , and essentially
the same argument implies that the equilibrium path can be dominated. What
distinguishes this case is the fact that at the sink point, meeting and not
meeting have the same one period payo¤ for all persons. Thus, the social
planner can change ij for a length of time without changing payo¤s, but after
this length of time, payo¤s can be made higher, as illustrated in Section 3.2.
Now consider Case (iv). The equilibrium cannot be dominated. It has each
person always working in isolation. Thus, md(0) lies in (mI ; 1
2
] and md moves
right with time. If there were a dominating path, then the social planner
must force some pair to work together over a non-trivial interval of time. The
rst such interval of time will have values of md in (mI ; 1
2
], so the persons
working together will have lower income during this interval, contradicting the
assumption of domination.
Consider Case (i). Let ij(t) be the equilibrium path. When md(0) > mJ ,
ij(t) = 1=(N 1) for all t and for all pairs i and j, and the payo¤s frommeeting
always exceed not meeting for any person. Examining equation (36) and the
implied optimization problem (37), this is the unique path of meetings that
maximizes income over each non-negligible interval of time. So the equilibrium
path is not dominated by any other feasible path. Furthermore, the equilibrium
path either approaches (when N = 4) or reaches in nite time (when N > 4)
the most productive state, mB. When md(0)  mJ , similar to Case (iv),
strict domination cannot occur when md  mJ . The equilibrium path begins
at md(0) and reaches mJ in nite time. Combining this with what we have
determined about the equilibrium path starting atmd(0) > mJ , we obtain that
the equilibrium path is not dominated, and approaches the most productive
state.
In fact, for case (i) when md(0) > mJ , there is a much stronger e¢ ciency
result. As detailed in Appendix 3, the equilibrium path coincides with a
utilitarian socially optimal path where the planner has foresight.
Finally, consider Case (ii), when mB < md(0)  bm. Examining equa-
tion (36) and the implied optimization problem (42), this path of meetings
maximizes income over each non-negligible interval of time. So the equilib-
rium path is not dominated by any other feasible path, but unlike Case (i), it
approaches md = 1=3, that is not the most productive state.
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Clearly, initial heterogeneity plays an important role in the e¢ ciency prop-
erties of the equilibrium path. What distinguishes Case (i), aside from a rela-
tively homogeneous beginning, is that the dancers can switch partners rapidly
enough to increase heterogeneity while at the same time maximizing the in-
crease in output. That is because each agent spends 1=(N   1) of the time
dancing with any particular agent, and (N   2)=(N   1) of the time dancing
with others. This is what leads to the most productive state. In other cases,
e¢ ciency would require less heterogeneity than in the initial state, which can
only be attained by dancing with a restricted set of partners. This builds
up an asymmetry in an agents relationship with others, in that the agent has
more in common with those they have danced with previously, and makes the
most productive state unattainable without foresight. It also explains how,
with a large initial heterogeneity of agents, asymmetry in their relationships
is introduced and is built on along the equilibrium path.
6 Why 4?
We have seen that once the agents reach the bliss point (where the growth
rate is highest), achieved from large initial homogeneity by cycling through all
partners as rapidly as possible, they break into groups of 4 (see Proposition 1,
part (i)). This dance pattern allows them to remain at the highest productivity
forever. It is natural to ask why 4 is the magic number. In order to see this, we
must place the model in a more general context. In particular, we generalize
our joint knowledge creation function (7) as follows:
aij =   (ncij)  (ndij  ndji)
1 
2 0 <  < 1
The parameter  represents the weight on knowledge in common as opposed
to di¤erential knowledge in the production of new ideas. This parameter is
crucial in determining the bliss point. Of course, up to now, we have set
 = 1=3. The remainder of the model is unchanged.
First we calculate the bliss point in this more general setting. Analogous
to equation (22), the growth rate function under pairwise symmetry is modied
as follows:
g(m)    (1  2m)
 m(1 )
1 m (63)
Setting g0(m) = 0, the bliss point mB is given by
mB() =
1  
2   (64)
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As expected, when  = 1=3, mB = 2=5. For  = 0, mB = 1=2; mB decreases
monotonically in , reaching mB = 0 when  = 1, which is not surprising.
When all the agents start with initial heterogeneity md(0) < mB() and
are pairwise symmetric, equilibrium dynamics are essentially the same as in
Proposition 1 (i). Thus, analogous to the previous derivation of (35), when
mJ < m < mB(), using (33), (34) and (31) we have the following equilibrium
dynamics:
_md = fN   2
N   1  m
d  2N   3
N   1 g    (1  2m
d)  (md)1  (65)
Setting _md = 0, we obtain the sink point
md =
N   2
2N   3 (66)
which is independent of  and is 2=5 when N = 4. Since md is increasing in
N , for su¢ ciently large N , the sink point heterogeneity exceeds the bliss point
heterogeneity, namely md > mB(). So when the equilibrium heterogeneity
reaches the bliss point mB(), the agents must split into smaller groups in
order to maintain the optimal level of heterogeneity, mB(). To analyze the
optimal group size, we set the heterogeneity of the sink point of the dynamic
process to the heterogeneity at the bliss point:
md = mB()
Thus, using (64) and (66), we obtain the optimal group size
NB() = 1 +
1

(67)
which is 4 when  = 1=3, as expected. Assuming that the optimal group size
NB() and the number of groups N=NB() are integers, when the equilibrium
dynamics reachmB(), groups of size NB() form and each member of a group
dances only with members of the group, spending an equal amount of time
dancing with every member of the group with ij(t) = 1=(NB()  1).
Equilibrium dynamics when initial heterogeneity is larger than mB are
essentially unchanged from Proposition 1 (ii)-(iv), but explicit solutions are
not readily obtainable. Nevertheless, the equilibrium dance patterns and
intuition are robust.
The main implication of this analysis is that if knowledge in common is
important ( is close to 1), the equilibrium and optimal grouping of dancers
is rather small. This may explain the large number of small rms in Higashi
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Osaka or in Ota ward in Tokyo, each specializing in di¤erent but related man-
ufacturing services. Another example is the third Italy, which produces a large
variety of di¤erentiated products. In each case, tacit knowledge accumulated
within rms plays a central role in the operation of the rms. (An extreme
example is marriage, when NB() = 2.) In contrast, when di¤erentiated
knowledge is important ( is close to 0), then the equilibrium and optimal
group size is large, for example in academic departments and research labs.
We may also observe that when the system reaches the bliss point, the
dancers break into groups and the system becomes asymmetric, in the following
sense. If dancer i belongs to the same group as dancer k, then their di¤erential
knowledge remains at the bliss pointmB, maintaining the highest productivity
g(mB). If dancer j belongs to a di¤erent group, then the di¤erential knowledge
between i and j diverges, namely it moves away frommB, thus reducing g(mdij).
So once the population splits into groups, dancers i and j will not want to
collaborate again. In other words, our model generates boundaries of research
teams endogenously.
7 Conjectures and Conclusions
We have considered a model of knowledge creation that is based on individual
behavior, allowing myopic agents to decide whether joint or individual pro-
duction is best for them at any given time. We have allowed them to choose
their best partner or to work in isolation. This is a pure externality model of
knowledge creation. One would not expect that equilibria would be e¢ cient
for two reasons: the agents are myopic, and there are no markets. The em-
phasis of our model is on endogenous agent heterogeneity, whereas we examine
the permanent e¤ects of knowledge creation and accumulation.
In the case of two people, there are two sink points (equilibria) for the
knowledge accumulation process. The state where the two agents have a
negligible proportion of ideas in common is attainable as an equilibrium from
some initial conditions. There is one additional and more interesting sink,
involving a large degree of homogeneity in the two agents, and this is attainable
from a non-negligible set of initial conditions. Relative to the most productive
state, the rst sink point has agents that are too heterogeneous, while the
second sink point has agents that are too homogeneous.
With N persons, assuming that N is large enough, we nd that, surpris-
ingly, for a range of initial conditions that imply a large degree of homogeneity
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among agents, the sink is the most productive state. The population breaks
into optimal size groups when it reaches the most productive state. The
size of these groups is inversely related to the weight given to homogeneity in
knowledge production.
The sink point depends discontinuously on initial conditions. Moreover,
there are only 4 possible equilibrium paths. If agents begin with a large degree
of heterogeneity, then the sink is ine¢ cient, and it can be one of several points,
including the analog of the relatively homogeneous sink in the two person
case. Despite a symmetric set of initial conditions, asymmetries can arise
endogenously in our structure. In particular, each agent might communicate
pairwise with some, but not all other, agents in equilibrium. The asymmetries
that arise can partition the agents endogenously into di¤erent groups, giving
rise to an asymmetric interaction structure from a situation that is initially
symmetric. Bearing in mind its limitations, the model could be tested using
data on coauthorships in various academic disciplines or collaborative work in
other elds. Returning to a question posed in the introduction, the empirical
pattern of team size in Broadway musicals, from smaller teams to larger ones
over a 50 year period, is explained by the increasing complexity of producing
these musicals, and thus a need for more heterogeneity in the teams.
Many extensions of our work come to mind. It is important and interesting
to add knowledge transfer to the model with more than 2 people. Then we
can study comparative statics with respect to speeds of knowledge transfer
and knowledge creation on the equilibrium outcome and on its e¢ ciency. It
would also be interesting to add knowledge transfer without meetings, similar
to a public good. For instance, agents might learn from publicly available
sources of information, like newspapers or the web.24 Markets for ideas would
also be a nice feature. One set of extensions would allow agents to decide,
in addition to the people they choose with whom to work, the intensity of
knowledge creation and exchange.
We note that what we have done, in essence, is to open the black box
of knowledge externalities in more aggregate models to nd smaller black
boxes inside that we use in our model. These black boxes are given by
the exogenous functions representing knowledge transfer and creation within
a meeting of two agents. Our contribution is to solve the matching problem
of agents in a dynamic context given this structure. It will be important to
24Stability of our equilibria with respect to small amounts of public information or infor-
mation spillovers is an important topic for future research.
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open our black boxes as well. That is, the microstructure of knowledge
creation and transfer within meetings must be explored. It will be useful to
proceed in the opposite direction as well, aggregating our model up to obtain an
endogenous growth framework, to see if our equilibrium patterns and e¢ ciency
results persist.
Another set of extensions would be to add stochastic elements to the model,
so the knowledge creation and transfer process is not deterministic. As re-
marked in the introduction, probably our framework can be developed from a
more primitive stochastic model, where the law of large numbers is applied to
obtain our framework as a reduced form.25
An important application of our work would be to the literature on intel-
lectual property, to provide microstructure for the idea production process; see
Scotchmer (2004) and Boldrin and Levine (2005) for interesting and provoca-
tive treatments.
Eventually, we must return to our original motivation for this model, as
stated in the introduction. Location seems to be an important feature of
knowledge creation and transfer, so regions and migration are important, along
with urban economic concepts more generally; for example, see Duranton and
Puga (2001) and Helsley and Strange (2004). Using patent data, Agrawal et
al (2003) nd that when an inventor moves, he cites patents from his previous
location more than patents at other locations. The reason could be connected
with mutual knowledge. It would be very useful to extend the model to more
general functional forms. It would be interesting to proceed in the opposite
direction by putting more structure on our concept of knowledge, allowing
asymmetry or introducing notions of distance, such as a metric, on the set
of ideas26 or on the space of knowledge. Finally, it would be useful to add
vertical di¤erentiation of knowledge, as in Jovanovic and Rob (1989), to our
model of horizontally di¤erentiated knowledge.
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Figure 1: The g(m) curve and the bliss point when  = 1.
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Figure 2: Possible meetings when N = 4.
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Figure 3: Correspondence between the initial point md(0) and the long-run
equilibrium point md(1).
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Figure 4: (a) Real lines with arrows: the md13

md(0)

curve and the
determination of the switching positions md13

md0

and md12

md0

. (b) Broken
lines with arrows: the ~md

md(0)

curve and the switching position ~md

md0

.
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8 Appendix 0: Denition and Nonemptiness
of the Myopic Core
Denitions: We say that measurable paths ij : R+ ! [0; 1] for i; j = 1; :::; N
are feasible if for all t 2 R+,
PN
i=1 ij = 1 for j = 1; :::; N ;
PN
j=1 ij = 1 for
i = 1; :::; N ; ij = ji for i = 1; :::; N , j = 1; :::; N . We associate with
any feasible paths fijg continuous functions aij : R+ ! R+ for i = 1; :::; N ,
j = 1; :::; N , satisfying the equations of motion (6), (7), (12), and (13) where
ij is permitted to take on fractional values. For notational simplicity, we omit
the paths ij as arguments in the functions aij. For any coalition S  f1; :::; Ng,
let DS = f(dij)i;j2S with dij 2 [0; 1] for all i; j 2 S,
P
i2S dij = 1 for j 2 S;P
j2S dij = 1 for i 2 S; dij = dji for i = 1; :::; N , j = 1; ::Ng. Paths fijg
are in the myopic core if they are feasible and at each time t 2 R+, there
is no coalition S  f1; :::; Ng and (dij)i;j2S 2 DS such that for all i 2 SP
;j2S dijaij(t) >
P
;j2S ij(t)aij(t).
Theorem 0: The myopic core is nonempty. Moreover, if N = 2, there is
a myopic core path with ij(t) 2 f0; 1g.
Proof of Theorem 0: For any xed time t and any coalition S if
we dene V (S) = f(u1; :::; uN) 2 RN j 9(dij)i;j2S 2 DS such that 8i 2 S
ui 
P
j2S dijaij(t)g then V denes a nontransferable utility game in charac-
teristic function form. Next we show that the myopic core is nonempty. To
accomplish this, we show that the game at each period t is balanced and apply
Scarfs theorem (see Hildenbrand and Kirman, 1976, p. 71). Let S be a bal-
anced family of coalitions and let wS (S 2 S) be the balancing weights. So for
each i,
P
fS2Sji2SgwS = 1. Let (u1; :::; uN) 2 \S2SV (S). So for each S 2 S,
for each i 2 S, there exists (dij(S))i;j2S 2 DS with ui 
P
j2S d

ij(S)aij(t).
Then for each i = 1; :::; N
ui 
X
S2S
wS
X
i;j2S
dij(S)aij(t) =
NX
j=1
X
fS2Sji;j2Sg
wS  dij(S)aij(t):
Then (
P
fS2Sji;j2SgwSdij(S))Ni;j=1 2 Df1;:::;Ng. Hence by denition of V (f1; :::; Ng),PN
j=1
P
fS2Sji;j2SgwS  dij(S)aij(t) 2 V (f1; :::; Ng), and the game is balanced.
Applying Scarfs theorem, the core at each time t is nonempty. Using a stan-
dard selection result (Klein and Thompson, 1984, p. 163), since we know that
the correspondence from time t to myopic core at that time is closed valued,
we can select from it a measurable myopic core path.
If N = 2 and if ij(t) 2 (0; 1), then it must be the case that aij(t) =
aii(t) = ajj(t). So without loss of generality, we can take ij(t) 2 f0; 1g.
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Remark: In the case where the derivative of the percentage increase in
income is used as a further renement of myopic core, the same type of result
holds. Simply x a time t, add  > 0 to those aij(t) with highest second
derivatives, apply the proof, and let  tend to 0. We obtain a sequence of
ij(t) vectors that are in the core of the modied game at time t. As the
vectors of feasible ij(t) lie in a compact set, a convergent subsequence can be
drawn that has a limit in the rened core at time t. Again, the rened myopic
core is closed valued, so we can select from it a measurable rened myopic core
path.
9 Appendix 1: Analysis of Phase 1
Lemma 1: Assuming symmetry of initial conditions for four persons, suppose
that 2=5 < md(0) < 1=2. If initial partnerships are given by P1 in (43), and
the same partnerships are maintained, then there exists a time t0 such that for
t > 0,
g(md12(t))
>
<
g(md13(t)) as t
<
>
t0 (68)
and the following relationship holds at time t0:
md13(t
0) =
2
5
+
 
md(0)  2
5
  
1 md(0)
md(0)2
h
2 

1
md(0)
  2

4  1
md(0)
i (69)
Proof of Lemma 1: Under the partnerships P1 in (43), rst we show that
there exists a unique time t0 > 0 such that
g(md12(t
0)) = g(md13(t
0)) (70)
To show this, we make a few preliminary observations. First, for any i 6= j
at any time, since ndij = n
d
ji means m
d
ij = m
d
ji, going backward through the
last part of the calculations in the proof of Theorem A1 (Technical Appendix
a), and recalling the denition of the function g(m) and aij for i 6= j, we can
readily show that
g(mdij) =
  ncij  (ndij)2 13
ni
when ndij = n
d
ji (71)
Next, under the partnerships P1, since 1k = 0 for all k 6= 2, we have by
(12) that _nd12 = 0; by symmetry, _n
d
21 = 0. That is, when 1 and 2 are dancing
together, since there is no creation of di¤erential knowledge between the two,
it holds at any time t that
nd12(t) = n
d
21(t) = n
d(0) (72)
44
Thus, using (7), the number of ideas created by the partnership f1; 2g from
time 0 to time t is given by
nc12(t) =
Z t
0


nc12(s)  nd(0)2
 1
3 ds (73)
and hence
nc12(t) = n
c
21(t) = n
c(0) + nc12(t) (74)
Concerning the shadow partnership f1; 3g, since dancers 1 and 3 have not met
prior to time t, the number of ideas they have in common is the number they
had in common initially:
nc13(t) = n
c(0) (75)
Furthermore, setting i = 1 and j = 3 in (12) where 12 = 1 and 1k = 0 for all
k 6= 2 under the partnerships P1, we have
_nd13 = a12 = 

nc12  (nd12)2
 1
3
Thus, using (72) and (74), and recalling (73),
nd13(t) = n
d
13(0) +
Z t
0
  nc12(s)  nd12(t)2 13
= nd(0) +
Z t
0
  nc12(s)  nd(0)2 13
= nd(0) + nc12(t)
That is, the number of ideas that dancer 1 knows but dancer 3 does not know
at time t is the number of ideas that dancer 1 knows but dancer 3 does not
know initially, plus the number of ideas that dancers 1 and 2 created during
their partnership from time 0 to time t. Similarly,
nd31(t) = n
d(0) + nc34(t) = n
d(0) + nc12(t) = n
d
13(t) (76)
where nc34(t) = n
c
12(t) by symmetry.
Now, at time t = t0, setting i = 1 and j = 2 in (71), and using (72) and
(74), we have
g
 
md12(t
0)

=
  [nc(0) + nc12(t0)]  nd(0)2	 13
n1(t0)
Likewise, setting i = 1 and j = 3 in (71), and using (75) and (76),
g(md13(t
0)) =
 
n
nc(0)  nd(0) + nc12(t0)2o 13
n1(t0)
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Hence, the equality (70) holds if and only if
[nc(0) + nc12(t
0)]  nd(0)2 = nc(0)  nd(0) + nc12(t0)2
which can be rewritten as follows:
nc12(t
0)  nd(0)2

1  2n
c(0)
nd(0)
  n
c(0)
nd(0)
nc12(t
0)
nd(0)

= 0
Since nc12(t
0)  nd(0)2 > 0 for any t0 > 0, this means that the terms inside the
braces be zero, or
nc12(t
0)
nd(0)
=
nd(0)
nc(0)
  2 (77)
On the other hand, using (75) and (76),
md13(t
0)  n
d
ij(t
0)
nij(t0)
=
nd(0) + nc12(t
0)
nc(0) + 2 [nd(0) + nc12(t
0)]
which can be restated as
nc(0) + 2

nd(0) + nc12(t
0)

=
nd(0)
md13(t
0)
+
nc12(t
0)
md13(t
0)
or
nc(0)
nd(0)
+ 2  1
md13(t
0)
=
nc12(t
0)
nd(0)

1
md13(t
0)
  2

Substituting (77) into the right hand side of this equation and arranging terms
yields
md13(t
0) =
nd(0)
nc(0)
  1
nc(0)
nd(0)
+ 2n
d(0)
nc(0)
  2
=
1  nc(0)
nd(0)
nc(0)
nd(0)
2
+ 2  2nc(0)
nd(0)
(78)
Setting t = 0 and using md13(0) = m
d(0), we have
md(0) =
nd(0)
nc(0) + 2nd(0)
or
nc(0)
nd(0)
=
1
md(0)
  2 (79)
Substituting (79) into (78) yields
md13(t
0) =
3  1
md(0)
1
md(0)
  2
2
+ 2  2

1
md(0)
  2

=
3  1
md(0)
2 

1
md(0)
  2

4  1
md(0)

46
Deducting 2=5 from the both sides of this equation, we can obtain
md13(t
0)  2
5
=
(md(0)  2
5
)
 
1 md(0)
md(0)2
h
2 

1
md(0)
  2

4  1
md(0)
i
which leads to equation (69) in Lemma 1. Hence, relation (68) holds if and only
if equation (69) holds. We can readily see that the right hand side of equation
(69) increases continuously from 2=5 to 1=2 as md(0) moves from 2=5 to 1=2.
On the other hand, using (47), we can see that the value of md13(t) increases
continuously from md(0) to 1=2 as t increases from 0 to 1. Therefore, for
any md(0) 2 (2=5; 1=2), relation (69) denes uniquely the time t0 > 0 at which
the equality (68) holds. Finally, since md12(t) decreases and m
d
13(t) increases
with time t and since the function g(m) is single-peaked at m = 2=5, we have
relation (50).
10 Appendix 2: Analysis of Phase 2
Lemma 2: At the time t0 that is dened by (50) each agent switches to a
unique, new partner with whom they have not worked previously.
Proof of Lemma 2: To examine precisely what form of dance begins at
time t0, rst notice by symmetry that the following relationship holds at time
t0:
mdij(t
0) = md12

md(0)

for all fi; jg 2 P1 (80)
mdij(t
0) = md13

md(0)

for all fi; jg =2 P1 (81)
Furthermore, assuming that 2=5 < md(0) < m^, it holds that
g
 
md12

md(0)

= g
 
md13

md(0)

>  (82)
and hence dancer i chooses at time t0 a strategy under the following condition:
ii = 0 and
X
j 6=i
ij = 1 (83)
Using (80) to (83), at time t0 we have
_yi
yi
= g
 
md12

md0

which is independent of ij. Thus, the equilibrium selection at time t0 requires
the evaluation of the derivative of percent income growth.
47
Hereafter we focus on person 1, and simplify the notation as follows:
md12

md(0)
  md12; md13 md(0)  md13: (84)
Then, the time derivative of the percent income growth rate at time t0 (divided
by a positive constant) is given as follows (see Technical Appendix c for proof):
d ( _y1=y1) =dt
g( md12)
=
 
1  md12
  g0( md12)  12  1  2 md12    1  md12  12	 (85)
+
 
1  md13
  g0( md13) 
( 
1  2 md13
  (1  12)   1  md13X
j3
21j
)
Since g0( md13) < 0, when we x 12 at any value between 0 and 1 (in particular,
at its optimal value), the maximization of (85) leads to the following problem:
max
X
j3
21j subject to
X
j3
1j = 1  12
which requires choice of a single k  3 and setting
1k = 1  12, whereas 1j = 0 for j 6= k, where k; j  3. (86)
Thus, we can rewrite (85) as follows:
d ( _y1=y1) =dt
g( md12)
=
 
1  md12
  g0( md12)  12  1  2 md12    1  md12  12	 (87)
+
 
1  md13
  g0( md13)  (1  12)  1  2 md13    1  md13  (1  12)	
Given that g0( md12) > 0 and g
0( md13) < 0, we can readily see that the right
hand side of (87) is negative when 12 = 1, whereas it is positive when 12 = 0.
Indeed, we can show that it achieves its maximum at 12 = 0 (see Technical
Appendix c for proof). Thus, setting 12 = 0 in (86), the second order condition
for equilibrium selection requires that person 1 chooses at time t0 any new
partner k 6= 2, and set 1k = 1. Likewise, each dancer switches to a new
partner at time t0.
Lemma 3: In the context of Lemma 1, suppose that the initial partnerships
f1; 2g and f3; 4g switch to the new partnerships f1; 3g and f2; 4g at time t0
where
g
 
md12(t
0)

= g(md13(t
0))
and
md12(t
0) = md34(t
0) < mB < md13(t
0) = md14(t
0)
48
Assuming that the new partnerships are kept after time t0, let t00 be the time
at which md12(t) and m
d
13(t) become the same:
md12(t
00) = md13(t
00)
Then, it holds for t > t0,
g
 
md12(t)
 <
>
g(md13(t)) as t
<
>
t00 (88)
and
g
 
md13(t)

> g(md14(t)) for t
0 < t  t00 (89)
Hence, indeed, the new partnerships f1; 3g and f2; 4g formed at time t0 can be
sustained until time t00. This second switching-time, t00, is uniquely determined
by solving the following relationship:
nc13(t
0; t00) = nd13(t
0)  nd12(t0)  nc12(t0) (90)
where nc13(t
0; t) is the number of ideas created under the partnership f1; 3g
from time t0 to time t  t0, which is given by (92). The position where md12(t)
meets md13(t) is given by
md12(t
00) = md13(t
00) =
2
5
  m
d(0)  2
5
5md(0)  1 (91)
Proof of Lemma 3: To examine how long the new partnerships will be main-
tained, let us focus on the partnership f1; 3g. Let nc13(t0; t) be the number of
ideas created under the partnership f1; 3g from time t0 to time t  t0, which is
given by
nc13(t
0; t) =
Z t
t0


nc13(s)  nd13(s)2
1=3
ds (92)
nc13(t) = n
c
31(t) = n
c
13(t
0) + nc13(t
0; t)
= nc(0) + nc13(t
0; t)
(93)
nd13(t) = n
d
31(t) = n
d
13(t
0) = nd(0) + nc12(t
0) (94)
Substituting (93) and (94) into (92) and solving the integral equation yields
nc13(t
0; t) =

nc(0)2=3 +
2
3
nd13(t
0)2=3(t  t0)
3=2
  nc(0) (95)
Using (93) and (94),
n13(t) = nc13(t) + 2n
d
13(t)
= nc(0) + 2nd13(t
0) + nc13(t
0; t)
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So,
md13(t) =
nd13(t
0)
nc(0) + 2nd13(t
0) + nc13(t0; t)
(96)
At any time t > t0, dancer 1 could switch from the present partner 3 to the
previous partner 2 who has been dancing with person 4 since time t0. Then,
nc12(t) = n
c
12(t
0) (97)
nd12(t) = n
d
12(t
0) + nc13(t
0; t) (98)
nd21(t) = n
d
12(t) by symmetry
so
n12(t) = nc12(t
0) + 2

nd12(t
0) + nc13(t
0; t)

which leads to
md12(t) =
nd12(t
0) + nc13(t
0; t)
nc12(t
0) + 2

nd12(t
0) + nc13(t0; t)
 (99)
Likewise, at any time t > t0, dancer 1 could switch from the present partner
3 to person 4 (instead of person 2). Then, since persons 1 and 4 never danced
together previously,
nc14(t) = n
c(0) (100)
nd14(t) = n
d(0) + nc12(t
0) + n13(t0; t)
= nd13(t
0) + n13(t0; t) (101)
nd41(t) = n
d
14(t) by symmetry
so
n14(t) = nc(0) + 2

nd13(t
0) + n13(t0; t)

and hence
md14(t) =
nd13(t
0) + n13(t0; t)
nc(0) + 2

nd13(t
0) + n13(t0; t)
 (102)
By di¤erentiating (96), (99) and (102), we have
_md12(t) =
nc12(t
0) 
nc12(t
0) + 2

nd12(t
0) + nc13(t0; t)
2 _nc13(t0; t) > 0 (103)
_md13(t) =  
nd13(t
0)
nc(0) + 2nd13(t
0) + nc13(t0; t)
2 _nc13(t0; t) < 0 (104)
_md14(t) =
nc(0) 
nc(0) + 2

nd13(t
0) + n13(t0; t)
2 _nc13(t0; t) > 0 (105)
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where, from (95),
_nc13(t
0; t) = 

nc(0)2=3 +
2
3
nd13(t
0)2=3(t  t0)
1=2
nd13(t
0)2=3 > 0
Hence, under the partnerships f1; 3g and f1; 4g, both md12(t) and md14(t) in-
crease while md13(t) decreases with time t. Let t
00 be the time at which md12(t)
becomes equal to md13(t):
md12(t
00) = md13(t
00) (106)
Then, since md12(t
0) < mB < md13(t
0) = md14(t
0) and since g(m) is single-peaked
at mB, it holds that
min

g(md12(t)); g(m
d
13(t))
	
> g(md12(t
0)) > g(md14(t)) for t
0 < t  t00 (107)
Hence, in the time interval (t0; t00], dancer 1 never desires to switch partners
from person 3 to person 4. It is, however, not a priori obvious which of
g(md12(t)) and g(m
d
13(t)) is greater in the interval (t
0; t00). However, given that
function g(m) is steeper on the right of bliss point mB in Figure 4, we can
guess that the value of g(md13(t)) is increasing faster (initially, at least) than
the value of g(md12(t)), and hence the partnership f1; 3g will continue until
md13(t) crosses the bliss point and then becomes the same as m
d
12(t). Indeed,
we prove this next.
In the context of Lemma 1, suppose that the initial partnerships f1; 2g
and f3; 4g switch to the new partnerships f1; 3g and f2; 4g at time t0, when
condition (70) holds. And assume that the new partnerships are kept after
time t0. Then, since each of f1; 2g and f1; 3g is pairwise symmetric, applying
(71) in the present context, for t  t0 we have
g
 
md13(t)

R g
 
md12(t)

as nc13(t)n
d
13(t)
2 R nc12(t)nd12(t)2 (108)
Using (93), (94), (97) and (98), it follows that
nc13(t)n
d
13(t)
2   nc12(t)nd12(t)2
= [nc13(t
0) + nc13(t
0; t)]nd13(t
0)2   nc12(t0)

nd12(t
0) + nc13(t
0; t)
2
= nc13(t
0; t)nd13(t
0)2

1  2n
c
12(t
0)nd12(t
0)
nd13(t
0)2
  n
c
12(t
0)
nd13(t
0)2
nc13(t0; t)

Hence, for t  t0, it holds that
g
 
md13(t)

R g
 
md12(t)

as nc13(t
0; t) Q n
d
13(t
0)2
nc12(t
0)
  2nd12(t0) (109)
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To simplify the expression above, we derive a useful equality. By denition,
the following identity holds at any time t:
n1(t) = n
c
12(t) + n
d
12(t) = n
c
13(t) + n
d
13(t) (110)
Setting t = t0 in (110), using the equality in (108) to substitute for nc13(t
0), and
solving for nc12(t
0) yields
nc12(t
0) =
nd13(t
0)2
nd12(t
0) + nd13(t0)
(111)
Similarly,
nc13(t
0) =
nd12(t
0)2
nd12(t
0) + nd13(t0)
(112)
Substituting (111) into the last term in (109) gives
nd13(t
0)2
nc12(t
0)
  2nd12(t0) = nd13(t0)  nd12(t0)
=
 
nd(0) + nc12(t
0)
  nd(0)
= nc12(t
0)
using (94) at t = t0. Thus, we can conclude that
g
 
md13(t)

R g
 
md12(t)

as nc13(t
0; t) Q nc12(t0) (113)
Let t00 be the time such that
nc13(t
0; t00) = nc12(t
0) (114)
Since equation (95) implies that nc13(t
0; t0) = 0 and since nc13(t
0; t) increases
continuously to 1 as t tends to 1, equation (114) uniquely denes t00 > t0.
Hence, we can conclude from (113) that for t  t0,
g
 
md13(t)

R g
 
md12(t)

as t Q t00 (115)
Substituting (111) into (99) and setting t = t00 and using nc13(t
0; t00) =
nc12(t
0) = nd13(t
0)  nd12(t0) yields
md12(t
00) =
nd13(t
0)
nd13(t
0)2
nd12(t
0)+nd13(t0)
+ 2nd13(t
0)
Likewise, using (93) to set nc13(t
0) = nc(0) in (96) and using (112) also yields
md13(t
00) =
nd13(t
0)
nd13(t
0)2
nd12(t
0)+nd13(t0)
+ 2nd13(t
0)
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Hence, rewriting the expression above, and using the relations nd13(t
0) = nd(0)+
nc12(t
0) and nd12(t
0) = nd(0), we have
md12(t
00) = md13(t
00) = 1
nd13(t
0)
nd12(t
0)+nd13(t0)
+2
= 1
nd(0)+nc12(t
0)
2nd(0)+nc12(t
0)+2
= 1
1+
nc12(t
0)
nd(0)
2+
nc12(t
0)
nd(0)
+2
= 1
3  nc(0)
nd(0)
(using (77))
= 1
5  1
md(0)
(using (79))
which can be rewritten as (91). Thus,
md12(t
00) = md13(t
00) < mB = 2=5 (116)
This gives the alternative denition of time t00, which has been introduced in
(55). Thus, (113) and (114) imply (88) and (90) in Lemma 3. Finally, relation
(89) follows immediately from (107).
11 Appendix 3: E¢ ciency of the Equilibrium
Path
Here we discuss e¢ ciency in the context of an intertemporal utilitarian social
welfare function. We consider the following planners problem, where the
planner chooses fij()gNi;j=1 in order to:
maxW =
NX
i=1
Ui(0) =
NX
i=1
Z 1
0
e t  yi(t)dt =
NX
i=1
Z 1
0
e t  ni(t)dt
subject to
_ni =
NX
j=1
ij  aij = ni
(
ii  +
X
j 6=i
ij G(mdij;mdji)
)
and
_mdij =  
 
1 mdij
  ii   1 mdji  jj mdij  ij mdij   1 mdji G(mdij;mdji)
+
 
1 mdij
   1 mdji X
k 6=i;j
ik G(mdik;mdki)
   1 mdij mdij X
k 6=i;j
jk G(mdjk;mdkj)
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given ni (0) > 0 and mdij(0) > 0, for i; j = 1; :::; N . We must also account for
the obvious constraints:
NX
j=1
ij = 1 for each i = 1; :::; N
ij = ji for each i; j = 1; :::; N
ij  0 for each i; j = 1; :::; N
We assume that the discount rate is su¢ ciently large,  > g(mB), in order to
ensure that the objective is nite. Optimality requires that at each moment of
time, the following Hamiltonian is maximized by choosing fijgNi;j=1 and taking
into account the obvious constraints:
H =
NX
i=1
e t  ni(t) +
NX
i=1
i  _ni +
NX
i=1
X
j 6=i
ij  _mdij
where the multipliers follow the dynamics:
_i =  @H
@ni
for i = 1; :::; N
_ij =  
@H
@mdij
for i; j = 1; :::; N , i 6= j
and satisfy the following transversality condition:27
lim
t!1
H(t) = 0
Suppose that the following symmetric initial conditions for case (i) are
satised:
ni(0) = n(0) > 0 for i = 1; :::; N
mJ < mdij(0) = m
d(0) < mB for i; j = 1; :::; N , i 6= j
and g(mB) > 
Recall that the myopic equilibrium path for case (i) when mJ < mdij(0) is:
ij(t) =
1
N   1 for t < t
B for i; j = 1; :::; N , i 6= j (117)
ij(t) =
1
NB   1 for t > t
B when i and j belong to the same group
27This transversality condition comes from Léonard and Van Long (1992), Theorem 9.6.1,
p. 299.
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where tB is the rst time t such that m(t) = md(t) = mB, the bliss point mB
is given by (64) and the group size NB is given by (67).
Under these initial conditions, it can be veried that if N is su¢ ciently
large, then there exists a set of multipliers such that the myopic equilibrium
path detailed in (117) for case (i) satises the necessary conditions for opti-
mality.
When md(t) < mB and therefore t < tB, if each person works with every
other person with equal intensity, then knowledge productivity is higher than
working in isolation and mdij moves almost as fast to the right as working in
isolation. The intuition for this result follows from a combination of two
reasons. Productivity is higher when working with others as opposed to
working alone on this part of the path. When N is su¢ ciently large, working
with others is very close to working in isolation when the accumulation of
di¤erential knowledge is considered, so cooperation with others will be better
on net. Once the bliss point is attained, the system reaches the highest
productivity possible, and remains there.
This intuition indicates that, when md(t) < mB, working with a smaller
group than the other N   1 dancers generates movement to the right that is
slower than working with everyone but oneself. So coalitions cannot block
this path. Furthermore, once the bliss point is achieved, this is the highest
productivity possible, so coalitions cannot block this part of the path either.
Thus, the path chosen by myopic agents, that coincides with the utilitarian
welfare optimal path, is in the core with rational expectations.
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12 Technical Appendix
12.1 Appendix a
Theorem A1: The following identity holds for i 6= j:
aij
ni
= G(mdij;m
d
ji)
where the function G is dened by (17).
Proof: From (4) and (5),
ni = n
ij   ndji = nij 
 
1  n
d
ji
nij
!
= nij   1 mdji
thus
ni
nij
= 1 mdji (118)
Now, from (7),
aij
ni
=
nij
ni
 aij
nij
=
1
1 mdji
  mcij  mdij mdji 13
= G(mdij;m
d
ji)
which leads to (16).
Theorem A2: Knowledge dynamics evolve according to the system:
_mdij =  
 
1 mdij
  ii  1 mdji  jjmdij  ij mdij     1 mdji G(mdij;mdji)
+
 
1 mdij
   1 mdji X
k 6=i;j
ik G(mdik;mdki)
   1 mdij mdij X
k 6=i;j
jk G(mdjk;mdkj)
for i; j = 1; 2;    ; N .
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Proof: By denition,
_mdij =
d
 
ndij=n
ij

dt
=
_ndij
nij
  n
d
ij
nij
 _n
ij
nij
=
_ndij
nij
 mdij 
_nij
nij
=
_ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
=
 
1 mdij
  _ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
where, using (13) and (118), we have
_ndij
nij
=
P
k 6=j
ik  aik
nij
=
ii    ni
nij
+
X
k 6=i;j
ik  aik
nij
=
ii    ni
nij
+
X
k 6=i;j
ik  ni
nij
 n
ik
ni
 aik
nik
=
ni
nij

(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik  n
ik
ni
 aik
nik
)
=
 
1 mdji
 (ii  +X
k 6=i;j
ik  1
1 mdki
  mcik mdik mdki 13
)
=
 
1 mdji
 
8<:ii  +X
k 6=i;j
ik 

 
1 mdik  mdki
 mdik mdki 13
1 mdki
9=;
=
 
1 mdji
 (ii  +X
k 6=i;j
ik G(mdik;mdki)
)
Similarly,
_ndji
nij
=
 
1 mdij
 (jj  +X
k 6=i;j
jk G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
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while using (12) yields
_ncij
nij
= ij  aij
nij
= ij  

mcij mdij mdji
 1
3
= ij  
 
1 mdij  mdji
 mdij mdji 13
= ij  (1 mdij) G(mdij;mdji)
Thus,
_mdij =
 
1 mdij
   1 mdji
(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik G(mdik;mdki)
)
 ij mdij 
 
1 mdij
 G(mdij;mdji)
 mdij 
 
1 mdij
 (jj  +X
k 6=i;j
jk G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
=    1 mdij  ii   1 mdji  jj mdij  ij mdij   1 mdij G(mdij;mdji)
+
 
1 mdij
   1 mdji X
k 6=i;j
ik G(mdik;mdki)
   1 mdij mdij X
k 6=i;j
jk G(mdjk;mdkj)
12.2 Appendix b
Lemma A1: Whenmdij = m
d for all i 6= j and g(md) > , the time derivative
of _yi=yi is given by
d ( _yi=yi)
dt
=
 
1 md  g(md)  g0(md)  "1  2md   (1 md) X
j 6=i
2ij
#
Proof Lemma A1: From (18) we have
_yi
yi
= ii  +
X
j 6=i
ij G
 
mdij;m
d
ji

When mdij = m
d for all i 6= j and g(md) > , person i never wishes to
dance alone, and hence
ii = 0 and
X
j 6=i
ij = 1
Thus, we can set
_yi
yi
=
X
j 6=i
ij G
 
mdij;m
d
ji

58
Let
@G
 
mdij;m
d
ji

@mdij
 G1
 
mdij;m
d
ji

@G
 
mdij;m
d
ji

@mdji
 G2
 
mdij;m
d
ji

Then, taking the time derivative of ( _yi=yi) when mdij = m
d for all i 6= j, we
claim that
d ( _yi=yi)
dt
=
X
j 6=i
ij 

G1
 
md;md
  _mdij +G2  md;md  _mdji (119)
To see this, we use the denition of the derivative (an explanation follows
immediately):
d ( _yi=yi)
dt
= lim
t0!t
[
P
j 6=i ij(t
0) G  mdij(t0);mdji(t0) Pj 6=i ij(t) G  mdij(t);mdji(t)
t0   t ]
= lim
t0!t
[
P
j 6=i ij(t)  fG
 
mdij(t
0);mdji(t
0)
 G  mdij(t);mdji(t)g
t0   t ]
+ lim
t0!t
[
P
j 6=ifij(t0)  ij(t)g G
 
mdij(t);m
d
ji(t)

t0   t ]
+ lim
t0!t
[
P
j 6=ifij(t0)  ij(t)g  fG
 
mdij(t
0);mdji(t
0)
 G  mdij(t);mdji(t)g
t0   t ]
=
X
j 6=i
ij 

G1
 
md;md
  _mdij +G2  md;md  _mdji
The rst term of the expression becomes the right hand side of equation (119).
The second term is zero because mdij = m
d for all i 6= j, g(md) >  and g is
continuous so
P
j 6=i ij(t
0) =
P
j 6=i ij(t) = 1 for t
0 close to t. Noting that G,
mdij(t), and m
d
ji(t) are all di¤erentiable, the last term is limt0!t
P
j 6=ifij(t0) 
ij(t)g  fG1
 
mdij(t);m
d
ji(t)
  _mdij(t)+G2  mdij(t);mdji(t)  _mdji(t)g. Again, sym-
metry and the fact that no agent is dancing alone imply that it is zero.
When mdij = m
d for all i 6= j, _mdij is given by (35). Furthermore, on any
feasible path, ij = ji. Thus, using (35),
_mdij = _m
d
ji =
 
1 md  g(md) 1  2md    1 md  ij (120)
Hence,
d ( _yi=yi)
dt
=
X
j 6=i
ij 

G1
 
md;md

+G2
 
md;md
  _mdij
Straightforward calculations yield that
G1
 
md;md

=
1
3
  
h 
1  2md   md2i  23
1 md 
 
1  3md md
59
G2
 
md;md

=
 
h 
1  2md   md2i 13
(1 md)2
+
1
3
  
h 
1  2md   md2i  23
1 md 
 
1  3md md
Adding together and arranging terms give
G1
 
md;md

+G2
 
md;md

=

3

" 
1  2md   md2
(1 md)3
#  2
3
 m
d   2  5md
(1 md)4
= g0(md)
which follows from (24). Thus,
d ( _yi=yi)
dt
= g0(md) 
X
j 6=i
ij  _mdij
= g0(md) 
X
j 6=i
ij 
 
1 md  g(md)  1  2md    1 md  ij
=
 
1 md  g(md)  g0(md)  " 1  2md X
j 6=i
ij  
 
1 md X
j 6=i
2ij
#
=
 
1 md  g(md)  g0(md)  "1  2md    1 md X
j 6=i
2ij
#
as was to be shown.
12.3 Appendix c
Lemma A2: In the context of Lemma 1, the time derivative of the percent
income growth rate at time t0 (divided by a positive constant g( md12)) is given
by
d ( _y1=y1) =dt
g( md12)
=
 
1  md12
  g0( md12)  12  1  2 md12    1  md12  12	 (121)
+
 
1  md13
  g0( md13) 
( 
1  2 md13
  (1  12)   1  md13X
j3
21j
)
which achieves its maximum value when 1k = 1 for any single k 6= 2 whereas
1j = 0 for all j 6= k.
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Proof of Lemma A2: Using (80) to (84) and since ij = ji for any
feasible path, from (31) we have at time t0
_mdij = _m
d
ji =
 
1  md12
  g( md12)  1  2 md12    1  md12  ij	 for fi; jg 2 P1
_mdij = _m
d
ji =
 
1  md13
  g( md13)  1  2 md13    1  md13  ij	 for fi; jg =2 P1
(122)
Next, focusing on person i = 1, similar to the derivation of (119) in the proof
of Lemma A1 in Technical Appendix b, at time t0 we can obtain that
d ( _y1=y1)
dt
=
X
j 6=1
1j 

G1(m
d
1j;m
d
1j)  _md1j +G2(md1j;md1j)  _mdj1

where the functions G1 and G2 have been dened in Technical Appendix b.
Again, in the same manner as in Technical Appendix b, we can show that
G1(m
d
12;m
d
12) +G2(m
d
12;m
d
12) = g
0( md12)
G1(m
d
1j;m
d
1j) +G2(m
d
1j;m
d
1j) = g
0( md13) for j  3
Thus, since _md1j = _m
d
j1, it follows that
d ( _y1=y1)
dt
= g0(md12)  12  _md12 + g0(md13) 
X
j3
1j  _md1j
Substituting (122) into the right hand side above, and using the relation thatP
j3
1j = 1   12, we have equation (121) or (85) in the text. As explained in
the text, since condition (86) must hold at the equilibrium selection, we can
rewrite the equation (85) as equation (87).
Next, dividing both sides of equation (87) by a positive constant, 
1  md12
  g0( md12)   1  2 md12
we have that
V (12)  d ( _y1=y1) =dt
g( md12) 
 
1  md12
  g0( md12)   1  2 md12
= 12 

1  1  m
d
12
1  2 md12
 12

+C  (1  12) 

1  1  m
d
13
1  2 md13
 (1  12)

where
C 
 
1  md13
  g0( md13)   1  2 md13 
1  md12
  g0( md12)   1  2 md12
=
 
1  md13
  g0( md13)   1  2 md13 
1  md12
  g0( md12)   1  2 md12  g( m
d
12)
g( md13)
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since g( md12) = g( m
d
13). Using (22) and (24) yields
C =   m
d
13   25
2
5
  md12
 m
d
12
md13
Thus,
V (12) = 12 

1  1  m
d
12
1  2 md12
 12

  m
d
13   25
2
5
  md12
 m
d
12
md13
 (1  12) 

1  1  m
d
13
1  2 md13
 (1  12)

(123)
Since we have
0 < md12 <
2
5
< md13 <
1
2
it follows that
V (0) =
md13   25
2
5
  md12
 m
d
12
md13
 m
d
13
1  2 md13
> 0 (124)
V (1) =
  md12
1  2 md12
< 0 (125)
Next, taking the derivative of V at 12 = 0 yields
V 0(0) = 1 D
where
D  m
d
13   25
2
5
  md12
 m
d
12
md13
 1
1  2 md13
(126)
To investigate whether D exceeds 1 or not, denoting md(0)  md0, we have
from (33) that
md13 =
2
5
+ y(md0) (127)
where
y(md0) 
 
md0   25
   1 md0
2(md0)
2   (1  2md0)  (4md0   1)
=
 
md0   25
   1 md0
10(md0)
2   6md0 + 1
We can readily see that
0 < y(md0) <
1
10
for
2
5
< md0 <
1
2
On the other hand, using the equality g( md12) = g( m
d
13) and following the steps
in the proof of Lemma 1 (with md12(t
0) = n
d(0)
nc(0)+nc12(t
0)+2nd(0)), we can obtain
that
md12 =
2
5
  x(md0) (128)
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where
x(md0) 
 
md0   25
   4md0   1
5(md0)
2   4md0 + 1
We can also show that
0 < x(md0) <
2
5
for
2
5
< md0 <
1
2
Substituting (127) and (128) into (126) gives
D =
y(md0)
x(md0)

2
5
  x(md0)
2
5
+ y(md0)
 11
5
  2y(md0)
=
y(md0)
x(md0)

2
5
  x(md0)
1  10y(md0)
 52
5
+ y(md0)
Recalling that 2
5
< md0 <
1
2
, let us evaluate each component above. First, since
10(md0)
2   6md0 + 1 > 0 for 25 < md0 < 12 ,
y(md0)
x(md0)
=
5(md0)
2   4md0 + 1
10(md0)
2   6md0 + 1
 1 m
d
0
4md0   1
=
1
2
 5(m
d
0)
2   4md0 + 1
5(md0)
2   4md0 + 1

+md0   12
 1 m
d
0
4md0   1
>
1
2
 1 m
d
0
4md0   1
>
1
2
 1 
1
2
4  1
2
  1 =
1
4
thus
y(md0)
x(md0)
>
1
4
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Next,
2
5
  x(md0)
1  10y(md0)
=
2
5
  (m
d
0  25)(4md0 1)
5(md0)
2 4md0+1
1  10(m
d
0  25)(1 md0)
10(md0)
2 6md0+1
=
2
5

1  5(m
d
0  25)(4md0 1)
10(md0)
2 8md0+2
1  10(m
d
0  25)(1 md0)
10(md0)
2 6md0+1
=
2
5

8><>:1  1 +
1  5(m
d
0  25)(4md0 1)
10(md0)
2 8md0+2
1  10(m
d
0  25)(1 md0)
10(md0)
2 6md0+1
9>=>;
=
2
5

8><>:1 +
10(md0  25)(1 md0)
10(md0)
2 6md0+1
  5(m
d
0  25)(4md0 1)
10(md0)
2 8md0+2
1  10(m
d
0  25)(1 md0)
10(md0)
2 6md0+1
9>=>;
=
2
5

8>><>>:1 +
5
 
md0   25
  4md0 1
10(md0)
2 6md0+1

2(1 md0)
4md0 1
  10(md0)2 6md0+1
[10(md0)2 6md0+1]+(1 2md0)

1  10(m
d
0  25)(1 md0)
10(md0)
2 6md0+1
9>>=>>;
Since 2
5
< md0 <
1
2
and 10(md0)
2   6md0 + 1 > 0 for 25 < md0 < 12 ,
2(1 md0)
4md0   1
> 1
10(md0)
2   6md0 + 1
10(md0)
2   6md0 + 1

+ (1  2md0)
< 1
and
1  10
 
md0   25
   1 md0
10(md0)
2   6md0 + 1
=
5(2md0   1)2
10(md0)
2   6md0 + 1
> 0
Thus,
2
5
  x(md0)
1  10y(md0)
>
2
5
Finally, since y(md0) <
1
10
for 2
5
< md0 <
1
2
,
5
2
5
+ y(md0)
>
5
2
5
+ 1
10
= 10
so
5
2
5
+ y(md0)
> 10
Therefore
D >
1
4
 2
5
 10 = 1
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Hence
V 0(0) < 0
Since the function V is quadratic in 12, from the fact that V (0) > 0,
V (1) < 0 and V 0(0) < 0, we can see that V (12) achieves its maximum at
12 = 0. Therefore, we can conclude from (86) that the right hand side of
(121) achieves the maximum value when 1k = 1 for any one k 6= 2 and 1j = 0
for all j 6= k, as was to be shown.
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